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THE SHARED ASSUMPTIONS OF THE JURY SYSTEM AND THE 
MARKET SYSTEM 
M. NEIL BROWNE,* CARRIE WILLIAMSON** & GARRETT COYLE*** 
[The] common sense of twelve honest men gives a still better chance of just 
decision [than any other trial method].—Thomas Jefferson1 
The idea of irrational buyers or of impulsive buying behavior is a myth.—
George D. Downing2 
Assumptions are necessary, powerful, and potentially deceptive.  They 
direct our thinking from the shadows, moving our perspective toward the 
intended conclusion.  Bringing them out from the dark is a healthful activity in 
the main because it permits us to be more self-conscious and reflective about 
the conclusions we hold.3 
 
* Ph.D., Economics, University of Texas; J.D., University of Toledo; Distinguished Teaching 
Professor Bowling Green State University. 
** Carrie L. Williamson, Associate at DLA Piper Rudnick Gray Cary US LLP; J.D., 2003, Boalt 
Hall, University of California at Berkeley. 
*** Garrett Coyle, J.D. candidate 2008, New York University School of Law; M.A. Economics 
2005, B.A. 2004, Bowling Green State University. 
 1. JOHN GUINTHER, THE JURY IN AMERICA 209 (1988). 
 2. GEORGE D. DOWNING, BASIC MARKETING: A STRATEGIC SYSTEMS APPROACH 422 
(1971). 
 3. Identifying and evaluating these assumptions facilitates discussion about change in the 
legal community.  See Jeffrey J. Rachlinski, Heuristics and Biases in the Court: Ignorance or 
Adaptation?, 79 OR. L. REV. 61, 102 (2000)  (“[T]he adjudication process is better served when 
courts are aware of the cognitive biases that influence decision making than when they disregard 
them or fall prey to them.  Courts might overreact to the perception that illusions cloud judgment, 
but identifying a bias in judgment allows for public debate on the appropriate remedy.”).  The 
importance of assumptions in the law can be seen by their pervasive significance in many aspects 
of the law.  See Owen D. Jones & Timothy H. Goldsmith, Law and Behavioral Biology, 105 
COLUM. L. REV.  405, 413–16 (2005) (depicting the role of human behavioral assumptions in the 
law); Paul C. Pritchard, Our National Parks: Assumptions, Metaphors and Policy Implications, 8 
FORDHAM ENVTL. L.J. 421, 421 (1997) (on how assumptions “shape public policy”); Ugo Mattei, 
Three Patterns of Law: Taxonomy and Change in the World’s Legal Systems, 45 AM. J. COMP. L. 
5, 12–15 (1997) (describing the influence of assumptions in comparative law); Kyle D. Logue, 
Legal Transitions, Rational Expectations, and Legal Progress, 13 J. CONTEMP. LEGAL ISSUES 
211, 221 (2003) (on how assumptions influence legal transitions, particularly in liability law); 
JAMES B. ATLESON, VALUES AND ASSUMPTIONS IN AMERICAN LABOR LAW 1–16 (1983). 
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The American legal community tends to assume the overwhelming merit 
of both (1) the jury’s role in the adversary system of “justice” and (2) the 
distribution of resources and power associated with fealty to market outcomes.  
This support is not surprising; the market system and the adversary system are 
two fundamental American institutions.  Because they are bedrock components 
of our dominant intellectual culture, we often fail to evaluate the shared 
assumptions of these systems.  While these assumptions may hold true in some 
situations, they cannot be presumed accurate in individual, or even typical, 
instances. 
For example, when we rely on jury decisions as an arbiter in the adversary 
system, we reflexively make specific assumptions about the skills of certain 
cohorts of citizens to listen, integrate, and evaluate evidence.  Curiosity about 
the quality of those skills is crucial for efforts to legitimate the decisions of 
juries.  Similarly, the skills of consumers in understanding and assessing 
product information must be proficient for us to revere the putative “laws” of 
supply and demand.  In short, neither juries nor markets function as advertised 
unless very complicated cognitive processes are habitually deployed by jurors 
and consumers. 
Then where do we get the idea that these skills are commonplace for jurors 
and consumers?  The adversary system and the market are American 
institutions with deep-rooted histories.  As the first section of this Article will 
detail, these ancient origins are in part responsible for the unquestioned 
authority of these systems.  In other words, the assumptions of these systems 
are entrenched in tradition.  They are cemented into our thinking such that we 
rarely question them.  The first section will describe the long history of each; 
the second section will identify a common set of fundamental assumptions on 
which both the jury system and market processes lean heavily.  After 
identifying the core assumptions of both, the Paper concludes with an 
assessment of a particularly tenuous assumption of both systems: the belief in a 
rational decision maker who can be depended on to fulfill the promise of juries 
and market exchange.  The attractiveness of these assumptions is deeply 
embedded in the American embrace of individualism.  Hence, any weaknesses 
in these two primary decision-making institutions can be foreshadowed by 
recalling the major indictments against individualism.4 
 
 4. See M. Neil Browne & Michael D. Meuti, Individualism and the Market Determination 
of Women’s Wages in the United States, Canada, and Hong Kong, 21 LOY. L.A. INT’L & COMP. 
L.J. 355, 357–72 (1999) (indictments against individualism in labor law); Nancy Kubasek et al., It 
Takes an Entire Village to Protect an Endangered Species: Individualism, Overlapping Spheres, 
and the Endangered Species Act, 10 FORDHAM ENVTL. L. J. 155, 157–61 (1999) (indictments 
against individuals in labor law); Carlos A. Ball, Communitarianism and Gay Rights, 85 
CORNELL L. REV. 443, 447–48 (2000) (indictments against individualism in sexuality law). 
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I.  ORIGINS 
A. The Adversary System 
Although the adversary system and the market process share several 
assumptions, their specific origins are very different.  The earliest roots of the 
adversary system were the ancient modes of proof, including “ordeal, battle, 
and wager of law.”5  Each of these three methods relied upon divine 
intervention as the primary determinant of proof.6  Consequently, ancient 
forms of proof were irrational and unpredictable, as the methods of proof were 
very easy to manipulate, relying not on the strength of an argument, but instead 
on the physical strength and stamina of the accused.7 
These three ancient methods of proof waned in the thirteenth century,8 as 
the Fourth Lateran Council no longer permitted clergy participating in ordeals.9  
With the decline of these three medieval methods of proof, one of the earliest 
forms of the “jury” trial emerged, as sheriffs would often rely upon selected 
citizens to provide testimony about any knowledge they had that was relevant 
to a particular case.10  Alternatively, if these selected citizens did not know 
about the facts in dispute, they played an active role in “finding” facts related 
to the case.  Hence, the earliest “jurors” played a very active role in the judicial 
process, acting in a manner more similar to modern-day witnesses than passive 
 
 5. Ellen E. Sward, Values, Ideology and the Evolution of the Adversary System, 64 IND. L.J. 
301, 320 (1989).  Sward explains that in ordeal, the party with the burden of proof would have to 
swear an oath, after which a priest would require that the individual undergo a test of his oath.  Id.  
Frequently, individuals would have their hands covered in leaves and would have to carry a red-
hot iron.  Id.  If the individuals could show that the iron did not burn them, their cases were 
effectively proven.  Id.  Sward explains that battle was another alternative to resolve disputes.  Id.  
However, if parties opted not to battle against each other, they could hire champions to fight on 
their behalf.  Id. at 320–22.  Assuming God would intervene, the victor proved his case.  Id.  
Finally, a party could swear an oath under wager of law, while also producing other citizens who 
would make oaths of their own.  Id. at 320–21.  By demonstrating the accuracy of one’s oath with 
the support of community members, an individual could prove his case.  Id.  Similarly, other 
forms of ordeal included placing one’s arm in boiling water or immersing oneself in water.  
Stephan A. Landsman, A Brief Survey of the Development of the Adversary System, 44 OHIO ST. 
L.J. 713, 718 (1983).  In the former method of ordeal, a party proved his case if his arm was not 
burnt.  In the latter, an individual proved his case if he sank briefly.  Id. 
 6. Landsman, supra note 5, at 719 (“Direct heavenly intercession was postulated for ordeal 
and battle, and eternal damnation was supposed to enforce the oath-taking mechanism.”). 
 7. Sward, supra note 5, at 321. 
 8. Id. 
 9. Edward L. Rubin, Trial by Battle. Trial by Argument., 56 ARK. L. REV. 261, 272–73 
(2003).  Rubin explains that in 1215, the Fourth Lateran Council forbade ordeals because they 
were concerned about the theological implications of humans’ requiring miracles of God.  Id.  
Furthermore, the Council abolished ordeals in response to allegations that priests were being 
bribed to heat the irons to lesser or greater degrees.  Id. 
 10. Sward, supra note 5, at 320–22. 
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jurors.11  This early form of the jury marked a crucial shift from trial-by-battle 
to trial-by-argument, as judicial processes relied more heavily on the strength 
of evidence than acts of God.12  If we stopped at this point in the evolution of 
juries, we would, we think, feel very warmly toward a jury trial.  At least 
people will not be hacking away in some barbaric conflation between physical 
prowess and truth. 
Between 1200 and 1700, lawyers occupied a much more prominent role as 
advocates and officers in the King’s court.13  With increased technicality of the 
laws, judicial power shifted from the King’s appointed civil servants to elite 
advocates, who occupied full-time positions as judges.14  Following the greater 
reliance on advocates, witnesses also began to play a more significant role in 
the judicial process in the sixteenth century, as voluntary and compelled 
witnesses replaced the inquisitive jurors as the primary source of information.15  
 
 11. Id. at 321–22. 
 12. Id. at 324.  Sward comments that the rise of science and the scientific method in the 
seventeenth century more firmly established a rational decision-making process, replacing the 
medieval methods based on physical strength and God’s intervention.  Id.  Philosophers such as 
Descartes and Spinoza, Sward explains, provided a useful model for the judiciary’s reasoning on 
the basis of physical evidence.  Id.  Sward states, 
The notion that there is an objective truth that can be discovered through reason is quite 
different from the irrational ancient modes of proof, which appealed to magic—if the right 
formula is used, or the right ordeal is prescribed, or if God is invoked properly, there is no 
need to think through the factual evidence. Rather, God and the system will provide the 
answer. The modern adversary system still has magical elements, but it is essentially a 
rational system. 
Id.; cf. Richard A. Posner, Legal Pragmatism, 35 METAPHILOSOPHY 147 (2004).  Similar to the 
problems related to the medieval reliance on God as a method of proof, Posner cautions that a 
strict reliance on the “system,” or on fixed rules, is equally as problematic.  Id. at 148–49.  Posner 
argues for an extension in the scientific method as it is used in legal reasoning.  Id. at 148, 154–
55.  Instead of our relying on deductive reasoning, from which we make decisions on the basis of 
“given” rules, Posner advocates legal pragmatism.  Id.  This theory of legal analysis involves our 
consideration of the social consequences of a judge’s decision, whereby judges are afforded 
greater discretion in their rulings.  Id. at 152.  Legal pragmatism, in Posner’s words, is “a 
forward-looking, empiricist, even in a broad and nonpartisan sense a political approach, as 
distinct from the backward-looking, rationalistic, rules-oriented approach of conventional legal 
thinking.”  Id. at 148.  In response to concerns raised by his critics, Posner contends that his 
version of legal pragmatism does not threaten the significance of precedent, as reliance upon 
precedent promotes stability in the law.  Id. at 151.  However, a judge relying on precedent must 
continue to be forward-looking, using precedent as a source of valuable information for what 
ought to be considered in new cases.  Id.  But Posner cautions, “[U]ltimately precedent to the 
pragmatist is a tool rather than a master.”  Id. at 152. 
 13. See Landsman, supra note 5, at 724–25.  Landsman notes that advocates eventually 
formed Inns of Court, which were organizations that trained advocates in the courtroom 
procedures and governance of the bar, leading to lawyers’ eventual role in their acquiring and 
presenting evidence.  Id. at 725. 
 14. Id. at 725. 
 15. Id. at 726. 
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Because of their awareness that witnesses may provide misleading or 
unreliable evidence, English courts established rules of evidence, including an 
early version of the hearsay rule,16 which provided an adequate foundation for 
a more thorough set of adversarial rules in the eighteenth and nineteenth 
centuries.17 
In the early eighteenth century, greater neutrality and passivity of jurors 
and judges solidified the adversarial system, as jurors were free to make 
decisions that conflicted with judges’ opinions.18  Hence, the jury functioned as 
 
 16. Id. 
 17. Id. at 727.  Despite the more prominent reliance upon judges, juries, and witnesses, 
English courts before the eighteenth century were still not adversarial for several reasons.  First, 
although the accused had increased access to legal representation for civil cases, English courts 
prohibited the defendant’s using lawyers in serious criminal trials.  John H. Langbein, The 
Prosecutorial Origins of Defence Counsel in the Eighteenth Century: The Appearance of 
Solicitors, 58 CAMBRIDGE L.J. 314, 314 (1999).  The accused was expected to provide his own 
defense.  Id.  Langbein cites a seventeenth-century judge who argued that the court’s requiring a 
defendant to testify on his own behalf constituted the most effective method for uncovering truth, 
as opposed to the court’s reliance on “artificial” testimony from a lawyer.  Id. at 315. 
  Second, earlier English courts were not yet fully adversarial because defendants were not 
permitted to call witnesses to testify on their behalf until 1702.  Rubin, supra note 9, at 276.  
Defendants were expected to present their arguments before a judge and jury, and the prosecution 
at times would compel witnesses to testify against the defendant. 
  Third, judges and jurors were not necessarily impartial or passive.  For instance, judges 
would frequently conduct the court proceedings by asking questions of the defendant, 
summarizing the case for the jury, and at times, judges would even compel jurors to reach a 
particular conclusion, while jailing or fining jurors who did not follow the judge’s instructions. 
Landsman, supra note 5, at 727–28.  The judge’s urging a verdict and punishing jurors who did 
not agree lasted until 1670.  Id. at 728.  Jurors also lacked the neutrality idealized by an adversary 
system, as jurors would conduct their own investigations before the trial even began, and were 
much more inquisitive in the courtroom.  Kirsten DeBarba, Note, Maintaining the Adversarial 
System: The Practice of Allowing Jurors to Question Witnesses During Trial, 55 VAND. L. REV. 
1521, 1526–27 (2002).  DeBarba noted that jurors functioned like witnesses, and that by the 
fourteenth century, jurors could be removed due to bias.  Id. at 1527; see also Ellen E. Sward, A 
History of the Civil Trial in the United States, 51 U. KAN. L. REV. 347, 354 (2003) (commenting 
that the transition of the jury as an inquisitive body to an impartial body took several centuries, as 
there was not a clear and formal change in the role of jurors). 
 18. See Landsman, supra note 5, at 730.  In earlier years, a judge could, and would, fine and 
imprison jurors who, in criminal cases, returned verdicts disagreeing with the judge’s decision.  
Id. at 728.  For example, in Penn’s Case, William Penn and his co-preacher, William Mead, were 
arrested for disturbing the peace because they had gathered to preach and pray.  See THOMAS 
ANDREW GREEN, VERDICT ACCORDING TO CONSCIENCE: PERSPECTIVES ON THE ENGLISH 
CRIMINAL TRIAL 1200–1800, at 222 (1985).  The jury returned a verdict that Penn was guilty of 
speaking on the street, but Mead was not guilty.  Id. at 225.  The recorder told the jurors: 
“Gentlemen, you shall not be dismissed till we have a verdict that the court will accept; and you 
shall be locked up, without meat, drink, fire, and tobacco; you shall not think thus to abuse the 
court; we will have a verdict, by the help of God, or you shall starve for it.”  WILLIAM FORSYTH, 
HISTORY OF TRIAL BY JURY 400 (1994).  When the jury found both men not guilty, the bench 
fined Edward Bushel and the other dissident jurors for their verdict.  GREEN, supra, at 225. 
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a check on government, thereby avoiding the pitfalls of an imperialistic 
government or judiciary.19  For example, the seventeenth century marked a 
clash between efforts to establish impartial judicial processes and the self-
interest of various governmental figures, namely the Stuart Kings, who 
attempted to remove or manipulate judges on the basis of political 
motivations.20  In response, Parliament passed the Act of Settlement in 1701 to 
guarantee the protection of judges acting in good faith.21  At the same time, 
England’s Chief Justice repeatedly emphasized the importance of the court’s 
ensuring a fair trial for defendants.22  As the bar continued to expand 
throughout the eighteenth century in England and America, advocates of the 
adversary system implemented appellate review, where certain courts acted 
solely to determine whether there was error in particular trials, and thus 
whether the rulings should be reversed.23 
Through the evolution of the adversary system, the right to a jury trial in 
the United States has become “a fundamental reservation of power in our 
constitutional structure.”24 Specifically, the Supreme Court states: “Just as 
suffrage ensures the people’s ultimate control in the legislative and executive 
branches, jury trial is meant to ensure their control in the judiciary.”25  In short, 
as a fundamental institution in the American legal community, the adversary 
system must exemplify the American values26 of equality, individualism, and 
liberty;27 the concept of an impartial jury makes that goal possible.28 
 
  Edward Bushel then sued under writ of habeas corpus in the Court of Common Pleas.  
Id. at 236.  In deciding Bushel’s case, Judge Vaughan determined that judges should not fine 
jurors, because the jury and judge “might honestly differ in the result from the evidence, as well 
as two judges may, which often happens.”  Id. at 243 (quoting Bushell’s Case, (1670) 124 Eng. 
Rep. 1006, 1012 (C.P.)).  Thus, the judge had to assume that the jury was telling the truth because 
juries were bound by oath to the good faith of their verdict.  Id. at 245.  Thus, the judge must 
accept the jury’s decision as final.  Id. at 246. 
 19. Landsman, supra note 5, at 731. 
 20. Id. 
 21. Id. 
 22. Id. 
 23. Id. at 735–36. 
 24. Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. 296, 306 (2004). 
 25. Id. 
 26. These American values can be contrasted with values of other cultures that inform their 
jury systems.  For instance: while individualism, equality, and liberty have molded the American 
jury system, the Japanese equivalent, the lay assessor system, has been strongly influenced by 
traditional Japanese values such as collectivism and deference to authority.  See Kent Anderson & 
Mark Nolan, Lay Participation in the Japanese Justice System: A Few Preliminary Thoughts 
Regarding the Lay Assessor System (saiban-in seido) from Domestic, Historical, and 
International Psychological Prescriptives, 37 VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 935, 987–89 (2004). 
 27. See generally ALEXIS DE TOCQUEVILLE, DEMOCRACY IN AMERCIA (Phillips Bradley 
ed., 1945).  Touqueville described the manner in which the jury system exemplifies the American 
values of equality and liberty when he wrote, 
SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW 
2006] THE SHARED ASSUMPTIONS 431 
B. The Market System 
The market system, on the other hand, had a less conspicuous evolution, as 
humans have engaged in economic activities since the “dawn of civilization.”29  
While the Romans looked favorably upon wealth and commerce, the traditions 
of classical Greece and Christianity frowned upon commerce and material 
acquisition.30  Early writers such as Aristotle and Socrates (in Plato’s Republic) 
suggested that there was a conflict between virtue and money-making.31  The 
Meno is forceful in severing the link between financial well-being and virtue.  
However, Aristotle believed that being rich is a desirable position, but that 
trade as a means toward wealth threatened an individual’s morality.32  
Furthermore, Aristotle viewed usury (using money to earn interest) as an 
unnatural activity.33  Christians also opposed usury and many forms of 
commerce, claiming that such wealth-seeking activities posed a threat to one’s 
salvation.34  One of the fundamental beliefs at the time was that as one person 
 
The jury, and more especially the civil jury, serves to communicate the spirit of the judges 
to the minds of all the citizens; and this spirit, with the habits which attend it, is the 
soundest preparation for free institutions.  It imbues all classes with a respect for the thing 
judged and with the notion of right.  If these two elements be removed, the love of 
independence becomes a mere destructive passion.  It teaches men to practice equity; 
every man learns to judge his neighbor as he would himself be judged.  And this is 
especially true of the jury in civil causes; for while the number of persons who have 
reason to apprehend a criminal prosecution is small, everyone is liable to have a 
lawsuit. . . . It invests each citizen with a kind of magistracy; it makes them all feel the 
duties which they are bound to discharge towards society and the part which they take in 
its government. By obliging men to turn their attention to affairs other than their own, it 
rubs off that private selfishness which is the rust of society. 
Id. at 284–85; see also Nathan Glazer, Individualism and Equality in the United States, in 
MAKING AMERICA: THE SOCIETY & CULTURE OF THE UNITED STATES 292, 292–306 (Luther S. 
Luedtke ed., 1992); Graham C. Lilly, The Decline of the American Jury, 72 U. COLO. L. REV. 53, 
53 (2001) (“To many supporters of the jury trial . . . . the American jury is as immutable as it is 
essential, an ironclad staple of just adjudication, right up there with mother and apple pie.”). 
 28. The jury system, while heavily influenced by fundamental American values, still adheres 
to some of its own unique value preferences; impartiality, independence, and competence are 
notable in this regard.  See Laura E. Little, Adjudication and Emotion, 3 FLA. COASTAL L.J. 205, 
206–08 ( 2002). 
 29. HARRY LANDRETH & DAVID C. COLANDER, HISTORY OF ECONOMIC THOUGHT 23 (4th 
ed. 2002); see also Patricia H. Werhane, Business Ethics and the Origins of Contemporary 
Capitalism: Economics and Ethics in the Work of Adam Smith and Herbert Spencer, 24 J. BUS. 
ETHICS 185, 185 (2000) (“The origins of capitalism in the form of commerce and free enterprise 
can be traced to a prehistoric era when people began trading with each other.”). 
 30. LANDRETH & COLANDER, supra note 29, at 23–24. 
 31. Id. at 31–32. 
 32. See id. 
 33. See id. 
 34. Id. at 36–39. 
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earned a greater profit, someone else incurred a greater loss.35  Whether market 
activity is a zero-sum game, as is being assumed here, is still being debated, 
with market advocates positing the general gain in welfare from market 
exchange.36 
Jerry Muller notes that Christians reconsidered their position with respect 
to the desirability of commerce, as the Late Middle Ages marked greater 
developments in the commercial economy.37  Muller states, “In the centuries 
from about 1100 through 1300, the commercial economy of Europe began to 
grow, cities to develop, and new financial instruments were invented.”38  
Although Christians were less hostile toward trade and private property, they 
still opposed usury and the pursuit of riches.39  Consequently, Muller observes, 
“The renewed emphasis on the prohibition of usury led to a clash between 
religious claims and economic developments.”40  This clash was captured in 
the Italian wit Benvenuti de Rambaldis de Imola’s commentary on Dante’s 
Divine Comedy, where he wrote, “Those who engage in usury go to hell; those 
who fail to engage in usury fall into poverty.”41 
The gradual ascendancy of market logic as a standard by which much of 
human behavior, including the making of university curricular decisions,42 
must begin with The Wealth of Nations.  Smith argues that the market provides 
public benefit, not only despite its being fueled by private greed, but because 
personal self-aggrandizement compels the businessperson to work on behalf of 
consumer sovereignty.43  That Smith’s logic was applied to a simpler world of 
mom-and-pop establishments,44 where his logic had its strongest nest, has not 
deterred it from being deployed mutatis mutandis to defend the social 
legitimacy of the Microsofts of the modern global economy.45 
 
 35. See LANDRETH & COLANDER, supra note 29, at 36–39. 
 36. See ROY J. RUFFIN & PAUL R.GREGORY, PRINCIPLES IN ECONOMICS 248–49 (3d ed. 
1996). 
 37. JERRY Z. MULLER, THE MIND AND THE MARKET: CAPITALISM IN MODERN EUROPEAN 
THOUGHT 7 (2002). 
 38. Id. 
 39. Id. 
 40. Id. at 9. 
 41. Id. at 9–10. 
 42. See DEREK BOK, UNIVERSITIES IN THE MARKETPLACE: THE COMMERCIALIZATION OF 
HIGHER EDUCATION 1–17 (2003); David Robertson, Students as Consumers: The 
Individualization of Competitive Advantage, in HIGHER EDUCATION RE-FORMED 78–93 (Peter 
Scott ed., 2000).  See generally NEAL RAISMAN, CUSTOMER SERVICE IN HIGHER EDUCATION 
(2002). 
 43. See 1 ADAM SMITH, THE WEALTH OF NATIONS (Everyman’s Library ed. 1964) (1776). 
 44. E.g., M. Neil Browne, The Metaphorical Constraints to Pay Equity: Why So Many 
Economists Are Outraged by Comparable Worth, 6 POPULATION RES. & POL’Y REV. 29, 41–42 
(1987). 
 45. See U.S. v. Microsoft Corp., 253 F.3d 34 (D.C. Cir. 2001). 
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Prospective purchasers are said to face eager sellers in a market for the 
purpose of exchanging goods and services for money.  Despite the social 
anodyne of surface courtesy, each buyer and each seller wants to do as well as 
he or she can.  The consumer wants to maximize his utility with a given budget 
of money.  Pursuing this maximization, he benefits by a low price for the 
goods and services.  On the other hand, the firms that sell the products want to 
increase their profits.46  Firms are interested in selling goods and services for a 
high price.  Consequently, a key feature of all markets is a struggle over price 
and the attendant quality of any good or service. Markets are arenas for 
personal achievement.  Domination is what is being sought.  The fundamental 
idea of social benefit emerging from a vigorous clash of interests is native to 
the jury system and to market exchange as an institution. 
The results from the struggle vary in important ways and in different 
contexts.  These contexts or market structures create institutional opportunities 
and restrictions that move the struggle in particular directions.47  In some 
market structures or forms, the struggle primarily benefits the buyers; in others 
the seller is the primary beneficiary.  The contextual social legitimacy of 
struggle over price and quality in markets should warn us of the possibility of a 
similarly broad range of skills in various juries. 
The market is a fundamental American institution.  To be so, it must have 
social approval.  But with the continuous conflict between the buyer and the 
seller, how can social legitimacy exist?  To establish that legitimacy, 
mainstream economic thought and any legal theories derived therefrom make 
certain assumptions about “the market.”48  These assumptions align themselves 
 
 46. Economic profit is given by the difference between the revenue earned from total sales 
and the costs of all the production factors used by the firm, valued by their market price.  James 
Thornton & B. Kelly Eakin, Virtual Prices and a General Theory of the Owner Operated Firm, 
58 S. ECON. J. 1015, 1024 (1992).  These costs include opportunity costs and lost revenue from 
not using production factors in their alternative uses.  Had the firm employed those resources 
somewhere else, it would have received wage or rent payments that current production has thus 
denied it.  “Profit” in this Article always refers to economic profits.  See HAL R. VARIAN, 
INTERMEDIATE MICROECONOMICS 326–27 (1999), for an extended discussion of alternative 
conceptions of profit. 
 47. See generally DICK PELS, PROPERTY AND POWER IN SOCIAL THEORY: A STUDY IN 
INTELLECTUAL RIVALRY (1998), for a philosophical treatment of the market struggle that Pels 
refers to as the contest between power and property.  An interesting leitmotif of his work is the 
argument that scholarly work is similarly a struggle where we are trying by argument to weaken 
the hold of our intellectual opponents on the minds of those whose judgment we respect.  Pels 
quotes Aristotle in this regard: “This is a habit we all share, of relating an inquiry not to the 
subject matter itself, but to our opponent in argument.”  Id. at 1. 
 48. See DEBORAH STONE, POLICY PARADOX: THE ART OF POLITICAL DECISION MAKING 17 
(1997). 
  A market can be simply defined as a social system in which individuals pursue their 
own welfare by exchanging things with others whenever trades are mutually beneficial.  
Economists often begin their discussions of the market by conjuring up the Robinson 
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with the democratic values of equality and autonomy so necessary for social 
legitimacy in our culture.49  The most basic of these assumptions is consumer 
sovereignty: Consumers hold the power, permitting the invisible hand to guide 
market transactions toward socially acceptable results.50  Consequently, a 
market structure is optimal only when it is consistent with the concept of 
consumer sovereignty.  While it is necessary for legitimacy, the presence of 
consumer sovereignty in a market structure is not guaranteed.  Therefore, 
consumer sovereignty should not be assumed to exist unless one first examines 
the particular market structure. 
Where can we look to see the influence of consumer sovereignty in our 
culture?  It is evident in legal reasoning.51  Notice how Justice Cole’s 
concurring opinion in Dupré Transportation Inc. v. Louisiana Public Service 
 
Crusoe society, where two people on a lush tropical island swap coconuts and small game 
animals.  They trade to make each person better off, but since each person always has the 
option of producing everything for himself, trading is never an absolute necessity for 
either one. 
Id.  Stone continues, 
  The theory of markets says that as long as exchanges meet these conditions of being 
both voluntary and fully informed . . . they lead to the goal of allocative efficiency: 
Resources always move in a direction that makes people better off.  This is because 
exchanges are choices. . . . Since no one would voluntarily exchange in a trade that made 
him or her worse off, and people would engage in trades only when at least one side was 
made better off, all voluntary exchanges must lead to situations where at least one person 
is better off and no one is worse off. 
  In the theory of markets, voluntary exchanges transform resources into something 
more valuable. 
Id. at 68.  See generally Martha C. Nussbaum, Flawed Foundations: The Philosophical Critique 
of (a Particular Type of) Economics, 64 U. CHI. L. REV. 1197, 1197–98 (1997) (describing how 
the Law and Economics movement has been built on a specific set of conceptual foundations, 
which are from mainstream neoclassical economics). 
 49. See generally EVERETT CARLL LADD, THE AMERICAN IDEOLOGY: AN EXPLORATION OF 
THE ORIGINS, MEANING, AND ROLE OF AMERICAN POLITICAL IDEAS (1994), for a description of 
the basic value preferences that constitute allegiance to American culture. 
 50. For market logic to be compelling, the ultimate beneficiary of the economic process 
must be some surrogate for everyone; the consumer plays this role in market thought.  See M. 
NEIL BROWNE & JOHN H. HOAG, UNDERSTANDING ECONOMIC ANALYSIS 81 (1983). 
[P]rices represent consumer signals to producers concerning how many resources should 
be devoted to production of a particular good or service. Prices also provide consumers 
with information concerning the availability of resources for production. Consumer 
sovereignty refers to consumer control over what is produced and the form the production 
will take. 
Id. 
 51. See Robin Paul Malloy, Framing The Market: Representations of Meaning and Value in 
Law, Markets, And Culture, 51 BUFF. L. REV. 1, 10 (2003).  Malloy details recent incorporation of 
economics into the law, particularly the increase use of economic vocabulary in legal reasoning.  
Id. at 6. 
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Commission52 rests upon certain market assumptions.  These assumptions 
underlie the reasoning and serve to grant legitimacy to the market as a solution 
to the issue in dispute.  He opines that the State should grant a required permit 
to the motor carrier because “the economy and the public interest thrive when 
rational men and women are left free to choose.”53  What is the market 
structure of the Louisiana motor carriers?  Justice Cole assumes, without 
justification, that the motor carriers operate in a competitive market,54 allowing 
rational consumers55 the opportunity to be “free to choose.”  However, were 
the resulting market structure less than competitive, then the public interest has 
been frustrated through the dominance of the motor carrier.  When 
assumptions are made in legal reasoning about consumer sovereignty without 
evidence as to the market structure, the social legitimacy of “the market” 
should be strongly questioned.  Indeed there is no version of capitalist theory 
that justifies market outcomes in situations where sellers have substantial 
market power. 
Players in the market—the buyers and the sellers—are in constant conflict 
over price and quality; the assurance of consumer sovereignty is necessary to 
encourage social legitimacy of the results from this clash.  But that assurance is 
not enough.  In American culture, the ideal market system must appear to be 
conducive to the democratic traditions of liberty and equality.  To portray this 
image, another assumption is relied on: “competition.”56  As the iconic market 
structure of capitalist theory, a competitive market is identified by the 
 
 52. 583 So.2d 475, 481–82 (La. 1991). 
 53. Id. at 482. 
 54. Id.  “The public, in whose interest the legislature purports to speak, is best served when 
the forces of competition are allowed to dictate both the number of participants in a market and 
the prices they will charge for their services.”  Id.  However, little is done to examine the extent 
of the “forces of competition” within the Louisiana motor carrier market. 
 55. If we assume that individuals have the capacity to make rational decisions, then it is 
reasonable to expect that particular market structures can create power disparities between buyer 
and seller, diminishing consumer sovereignty. 
 56. But see LESTER C. THUROW, BUILDING WEALTH: THE NEW RULES FOR INDIVIDUALS, 
COMPANIES, AND NATIONS IN A KNOWLEDGE-BASED ECONOMY (1999), for a very different, 
even conflicting, formulation of competition.  The meaning of competition being used in this 
Paper is the one responsible for the attractiveness of capitalist thought, the one on which our 
system of antirust law is based, and the one responsible for the normative judgments about “the 
market” flowing from the discipline of economics.  However, the term “competition” is 
increasingly being used as Thurow uses it to mean the capability of succeeding in the struggle 
with other firms, particularly now that many markets are global, rather than national.  See, e.g., id. 
at 237–38.  The social legitimacy of this type of competitiveness is relatively tenuous.  Who are 
the beneficiaries of such competitiveness?  What is the model, either inductive or deductive, that 
demonstrates the social benefit of competitiveness that results in the survival of one firm instead 
of another?  Not surprisingly, those who tout this newer form of competition seek relaxation in 
the legal impediments to what is often anticompetitive behavior under the guidelines for the form 
of competition used in this Paper. 
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following characteristics: when a market is competitive, (1) goods or services 
are produced by a large number of firms; (2) each firm produces only a small 
share of the products;57 and (3) firms face no barriers to entry or exit.58 
When the consumer is sovereign and when the market is competitive, then 
will the market structure be theoretically certified as legitimate?  Not quite.  
The key to market optimality is the presumed existence of the calculating, 
well-informed, intensely rational consumer in a context where power 
relationships permit the rationality to function freely.  In other words, to 
legitimize the market in American culture, it must be assumed that the 
consumer is an optimal decision maker.59 
 
 57. The market supply curve of a good is set like the market demand curve for a good.  We 
can derive the market supply curve by adding the supply of all the firms in the industry.  See 
ANDREW R. SCHOTTER, MICROECONOMICS: A MODERN APPROACH, 434–35 (2d ed. 1997). 
 58. See DAVID C. COLANDER, MICROECONOMICS 242 (5th ed. 2004). 
Barriers to entry are social, political, or economic impediments that prevent firms from 
entering a market. They might be legal barriers such as exist when firms acquire a patent 
to produce a certain product.  Barriers might be technological, such as when the minimum 
efficient scale of production allows only one firm to produce at the lowest average total 
cost.  Or barriers might be created by social forces, such as when bankers will lend only to 
certain types of people and not to other types. 
Id. (emphasis omitted); see also STONE, supra note 48, at 71.  “In order for markets to yield 
efficiency, there must be numerous buyers and sellers of any resource, so that no person or firm 
can influence the market price.”  Id. 
 59. A rich trove of evidence casts doubt on consumers’ ability to form meaningful demand 
curves in terms of their own considered self-interest, let alone to make decisions that have 
positive community effects.  See ROBERT E. LANE, THE MARKET EXPERIENCE 139–45 (1991).  
Lane compiles the evidence suggesting that as environmental complexity increases, cognitive 
complexity exhibits a curvilinear relationship: “[C]ognitive complexity matches environmental 
complexity to higher and higher points, and then, when the environment becomes too complex, 
‘stress’ or ‘trauma’ reduces cognition to simpler levels—perhaps even below the starting points.”  
Id. at 139.  Lane further points out the exceedingly complex stimuli that consumers face in the 
marketplace.  Id. at 141–44.  Thus, he concludes, in many cases, markets overstimulate market 
participants, leading to cognitive regression and a reduced ability to make instrumentally rational 
market decisions.  Id. at 144–45; see also Kurt W. Fischer & Louise Silvern, Stages and 
Individual Differences in Cognitive Development, 36 ANN. REV. PSYCHOL. 613, 639 (1985). 
  Ralph I. Allison and Kenneth P. Uhl found that in a blind taste-test, males who drink 
beer at least three times a week could not distinguish differences among five different brands of 
beer in terms of taste, after-taste, aroma, bitterness, body, foam, lightness, strength, or sweetness.  
Ralph I. Allison & Kenneth P. Uhl, Impact of Beer Brand Identification on Taste Perception, J. 
Marketing Res., Aug. 1964, at 36, reprinted in CLASSICS IN CONSUMER BEHAVIOR 109 (Louis E. 
Boone ed., 1977).  Moreover, when the participants in the study were grouped by the brand of 
beer they drank most frequently, none of the groups rated the taste of their preferred beer superior 
to all of the other beers.  Id. at 113–14.  The researchers conclude, 
[P]roduct distinctions or differences, in the minds of the participants, arose primarily 
through their receptiveness to the various firms’ marketing efforts rather than through 
perceived physical product differences.  Such a finding suggested that the physical 
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product differences had little to do with the various brands’ relative success or failure in 
the market . . . . 
Id. at 116.  The implication of this study is that consumers do not make many market choices 
based on price or product quality (characteristics that benefit them and, by extension, society); 
instead, they make these choices based on product marketing.  See also TIBOR SCITOVSKY, THE 
JOYLESS ECONOMY: THE PSYCHOLOGY OF HUMAN SATISFACTION 5 (rev. ed. 1992) (pointing out 
that 2.5% of U.S. GNP is spent on advertising).  Thus, rather than promoting the virtues often 
extolled by market advocates (thrift, economy, industry, and efficiency), consumers, by making 
market choices based on product marketing, encourage waste. 
  In a blind taste-test study of small, informal social groups of housewives, James E. 
Stafford found that the groups exert influence toward conformity on the members’ brand 
preferences for bread.  James E. Stafford, Effects of Group Influence on Consumer Brand 
Preferences, J. MARKETING RES., Feb. 1966, at 68, reprinted in CLASSICS IN CONSUMER 
BEHAVIOR, supra, at 249–50.  Moreover, Stafford found that within each group, the “leader” of 
the group influenced the extent and degree of brand loyalty of the group members.  Id. at 259–61; 
see also ELIHU KATZ & PAUL F. LAZARSFELD, PERSONAL INFLUENCE: THE PART PLAYED BY 
PEOPLE IN THE FLOW OF MASS COMMUNICATIONS (1955) (explaining the extent of the role of 
personal influence in shaping market decisions); GEORGE KATONA, THE MASS CONSUMPTION 
SOCIETY (1964) (arguing that market forces and psychological factors jointly determine 
consumers’ economic behavior).  This corpus of research suggests that consumers do not 
necessarily reward those firms who best cater to consumer interests; rather, consumers award 
firms on the basis of aleatory factors such as social group influences. 
  Robert H. Frank summarizes much of the scientific evidence suggesting that the 
correlation between income and happiness is extremely weak.  ROBERT H. FRANK, LUXURY 
FEVER: WHY MONEY FAILS TO SATISFY IN AN ERA OF EXCESS 72–73 (1999).  He writes, “One of 
the central findings in the large scientific literature on subjective well-being is that once income 
levels surpass a minimal absolute threshold, average satisfaction levels within a given country 
tend to be highly stable over time, even in the face of significant economic growth.”  Id. at 72.  
For example, “[a]lthough per-capita income [in the U.S.] was 39 percent higher in real terms [in 
1991] than [in 1972], the proportion of people who considered themselves very happy actually 
declined slightly over the period.”  Id.; see also SCITOVSKY, supra, at 134–36; Richard A. 
Easterlin, Does Economic Growth Improve the Human Lot?  Some Empirical Evidence, in 
NATIONS AND HOUSEHOLDS IN ECONOMIC GROWTH: ESSAYS IN HONOR OF MOSES 
ABRAMOVITZ (Paul A. David & Melvin W. Reder eds., 1974), reprinted in HAPPINESS IN 
ECONOMICS 5 (Richard A. Easterlin ed., 2002) (demonstrating that higher income in the U.S. 
between 1946 and 1970 was not systematically accompanied by greater happiness and concluding 
that economic growth does not improve the human condition); Richard A. Easterlin, Does Money 
Buy Happiness?, 30 PUB. INT. 3 (1973); DAVID G. MYERS, THE PURSUIT OF HAPPINESS: WHO IS 
HAPPY—AND WHY, 41–46 (1992) (showing that although real income per capita in the U.S. 
doubled from 1957 to 1990, only one in three Americans reported being “very happy”).  Myers 
writes that “our becoming much better-off over the last thirty years has not been accompanied by 
one iota of increased happiness and life satisfaction. . . . Making more money . . . does not breed 
bliss.”  Id. at 44 (emphasis omitted).  And, Frank writes, “[T]he average satisfaction level 
reported by survey respondents in Japan remained essentially unchanged between 1958 and 1986, 
a particularly striking finding in view of the fact that per-capita income rose more than five-fold 
during that period.”  FRANK, supra, at 72; see also RUUT VEENHOVEN, HAPPINESS IN NATIONS: 
SUBJECTIVE APPRECIATION OF LIFE IN 56 NATIONS (1993); Otis Dudley Duncan, Does Money 
Buy Satisfaction?, 2 SOC. INDICATORS RES. 267 (1975) (suggesting that although the real median 
household income in the Detroit area increased by 40% between 1955 and 1971, there was no 
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change in the satisfaction with the standard of living among wives in the Detroit area); see also 
Ronald Inglehart & Jacques-Rene Rabier, Aspirations Adapt to Situations—But Why Are the 
Belgians So Much Happier Than the French?  A Cross-Cultural Analysis of the Subjective 
Quality of Life, in RESEARCH ON THE QUALITY OF LIFE 1, 46 (Frank M. Andrews ed., 1986) 
(“Income and happiness are correlated at the national level, but the linkage is surprisingly 
weak.”); JONATHAN L. FREEDMAN, HAPPY PEOPLE 138 (1978). 
The rich are not more likely to be happy than those with moderate incomes; the middle 
class is not more likely to be unhappy than those with lower incomes.  As long as the 
family has enough money to manage . . . their reported happiness is at most slightly 
related to how much money they have.  For the majority of Americans, money, whatever 
else it does, does not bring happiness. 
Id.  For a defense against critiques of the surveys used to measure subjective well-being, 
happiness, and satisfaction, see MYERS, supra, at 23–30.  Frank notes, however, that the absence 
of a relationship between income and happiness does not hold across all levels of income.  He 
writes, 
[M]ost careful studies find a clear relationship over time between subjective well-being 
and absolute income at extremely low levels of absolute income.  Thus, in a country in 
which most people lack minimally adequate shelter and nutrition, across-the-board 
increases in income appear, not surprisingly, to yield significant and lasting improvements 
in subjective well-being.  In the same vein, average satisfaction levels are significantly 
lower in extremely poor countries than in rich ones. 
FRANK, supra, at 73; see also MYERS, supra, at 44  (“Once beyond poverty, further economic 
growth does not appreciably improve human morale.”) (emphasis omitted); see also Ed Diener & 
Carol Diener, The Wealth of Nations Revisited: Income and the Quality of Life, 36 SOC. 
INDICATORS RES. 275 (1995).  Nevertheless, Frank argues, “[W]hat the data seem to say is that as 
national income grows, people do not spend their extra money in ways that yield significant and 
lasting increases in measured satisfaction.”  FRANK, supra, at 77.  “[T]he evidence suggests that 
subjective well-being will be higher in the society with a greater balance of inconspicuous 
consumption.”  Id. at 90 (i.e., “freedom from traffic congestion, time with family and friends, 
vacation time, and a variety of favorable job characteristics”). 
  For more evidence questioning the claim that consumers make rational choices, see 
generally RICHARD E. NISBETT & LEE ROSS, HUMAN INFERENCE: STRATEGIES AND 
SHORTCOMINGS OF SOCIAL JUDGMENT (1980); R.P. Abelson, Social Psychology’s Rational Man, 
in RATIONALITY AND THE SOCIAL SCIENCES: CONTRIBUTIONS TO THE PHILOSOPHY AND 
METHODOLOGY OF THE SOCIAL SCIENCES (S.I. Benn & G.W. Mortimore eds., 1976); 
SCITOVSKY, supra, at 149. 
  The economist’s traditional picture of the economy resembles nothing so much as a 
Chinese restaurant with its long menu.  Customers choose from what is on the menu and 
are assumed always to have chosen what most pleases them.  That assumption is 
unrealistic, not only with respect to the economy, but of Chinese restaurants.  Most of us 
are unfamiliar with nine-tenths of the entrées listed; we seem invariably to order either the 
wrong dishes or the same old ones.  Only on occasions when an expert does the ordering 
do we realize how badly we do on our own and what good things we would otherwise 
miss. 
Id.  Thus, Frank’s evidence strongly suggests that consumers are not able to anticipate what 
purchases will make them happiest.  FRANK, supra, at 77.  The implication of this conclusion is 
that consumer demand curves and indifference curves—exalted by neoclassical economics for 
their reflection of optimal private (and, by extension, community) resource allocation and 
distribution—are meaningless.  But even if consumer preferences accurately reflect what will 
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As this Paper will further explore, this assumption is a required assumption 
before one can embrace either the market system or the adversarial legal 
system.  The juror’s rationality, like that of the consumer, must be acute for 
these institutions to deliver what their promoters promise.  In the foreground 
for idealized versions of market logic and the adversary system is the 
competent, focused citizen/household member.60 
 
make them happiest, the research of several economists, psychologists, and behavioral scientists 
suggests that consumers do not obtain sufficient information to make intelligent decisions in the 
market.  See George Katona & Eva Mueller, A Study of Purchase Decisions, in CONSUMER 
BEHAVIOR 30 (Lincoln H. Clark ed., 1954).  Katona and Mueller conducted a study of the 
purchases of major household appliances and found that most purchases of such goods were not 
made after careful consideration, nor were they preceded by a long planning period or shopping 
around or substantial information seeking.  See also Joseph W. Newman & Richard Staelin, 
Prepurchase Information Seeking for New Cars and Major Household Appliances, J. 
MARKETING RES., Aug. 1972, at 249.  Newman and Staelin conducted a study similar to Katona 
and Mueller and found that although information is accessible, the amount of information sought 
by most automobile buyers is small.  Id.; see also GEORGE KATONA, PSYCHOLOGICAL 
ECONOMICS 220 (1975). 
If careful deliberation [is] defined as comprising . . . consideration of alternatives and of 
consequences, discussion with family members, information seeking, as well as concern 
with price, brand, quality, performance, special features, and gadgets[,] the conclusion 
[emerges] that almost all people proceed in a careless way in purchasing large household 
goods. . . . [A]bout one-fourth of the purchases of large household appliances were found 
to have lacked practically all features of careful deliberation. 
Id.; Lewis Mandell, Consumer Knowledge and Understanding of Consumer Credit, J. CONSUMER 
AFFAIRS, Summer 1973, at 23.  Mandell found that a large fraction of consumers are not aware of 
interest rates charged on items such as house mortgages and automobiles.  Id.  Moreover, Mandell 
found that a large proportion of consumers understand neither the credit market nor why different 
types of loans have different costs associated with them.  Id. 
  Other research suggests that the structure of consumer wants does not yield transitive 
preferences necessary for instrumental market rationality.  See FRANK M. ANDREWS & STEPHEN 
B. WITHEY, SOCIAL INDICATORS OF WELL-BEING: AMERICANS’ PERCEPTIONS OF LIFE QUALITY 
231–33 (1976).  Andrews and Withey asked consumers to evaluate activities and objects in light 
of their resource use.  Id.  The survey respondents rarely referred to costs of “money, time, or 
energy,” and when they did refer to those costs, the references were not substantially related to 
satisfaction levels.  Id.  “Wants have structures, but not the ones that make preference ordering 
the rational, transitive structure that satisfies market rationality.”  LANE, supra, at 456.  This 
research is devastating to the assertion that consumers are adroit decision makers, for it suggests 
that they do not include costs when evaluating the extent to which alternatives satisfy their 
preferences. 
 60. Academics use many varieties of “rationality” in their analyses.  To write about the 
assumption of rationality in the law and the market, we must first define what variety of 
rationality is appropriate in this context.  Several options are applicable: As discussed in Kevin 
Quinn, A Rhetorical Conception of Practical Rationality, 30 J. ECON. ISSUES 1127 (1996), a 
person using practical rationality, or the rationality of action, would decide what the rational 
choice is by asking, “What is rational to do?”  However, instead of asking what action is the most 
rational, some academics focus on the question what belief is most rational.  The question “What 
is rational to believe?” is asked by adherents of a rationality called theoretical rationality, or 
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II.  SHARED ASSUMPTIONS 
When two institutions have origins as distinct as the jury system and 
market system, the question arises: for what creative purpose are the two 
juxtaposed?  We aligned these two systems with the intention of fulfilling two 
objectives: (1) to illuminate shared assumptions and (2) to assess these same 
assumptions.  Despite their different origins, these two institutions share a 
significant commonality: because of their pervasiveness in American culture, 
the shared assumptions inherent in these systems are rarely acknowledged and 
evaluated. 
What are these shared assumptions of the adversary system and the market 
system?  They include the belief in individual responsibility, equality among 
participants, and, as previously mentioned, a belief in the rational actor.  
Beginning with individual responsibility, this assumption is visible throughout 
the adversary system;61 it is characterized by a party’s control over the 
litigation process.  A party is responsible for pursuing his own self-interest, by 
obtaining legal representation, defining the legal issues, and creating 
persuasive arguments before an uninformed judge and jury.62  Even when a 
party selects legal representation, the lawyer is required to defer to the 
 
epistemic rationality.  Id. at 1129–33.  In the same vein as epistemic rationality, critical rationality 
is once again concerned with how to decide what to believe.  Credited to philosopher Karl 
Popper, a person who adheres to the concept of critical rationality would consider a decision as 
follows: in the process of deciding, he or she will understand that there is not one ultimate truth, 
but knowledge can still be acquired through critical analysis.  See generally DAVID W. MILLER, 
CRITICAL RATIONALISM: A RESTATEMENT AND  DEFENCE (1994)), for more details on Popper’s 
contribution on the subject of rationality. 
  On the other hand, another variety of rationality, instrumental rationality, is more 
consistent with the tenets of practical rationality than epistemic rationality because of its pursuit 
of action.  With the perspective of an instrumental rationalist, the most rational decision is the one 
which will best achieve the desired ends—without any evaluation of the propriety of those ends.  
See generally THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF RATIONALITY (Alfred R. Mele & Piers Rawling eds., 
2004) (providing an extensive overview of both the nature of rationality and the different 
conceptions of rationality in various disciplines of the university including philosophy, 
psychology, economics, legal studies, the natural sciences, and women’s studies).  For this 
Article, we chose to use practical rationality because the end results of the adversary and market 
processes are that the jury and consumer will act in such a fashion that the community will 
benefit.  In the case of the jury, it is assumed that the members will make decisions on the basis of 
social justice.  While market logic assumes that consumers are making price and quantity 
decisions on the basis of personal happiness, the community still benefits because the invisible 
hand process is alleged to transform that private rapaciousness into public gain. 
 61. See Sward, supra note 5, at 306, 317–18 (“[T]he adversary system best preserves the 
autonomy of the individual by allowing him free rein in making his case to the court.  Only by 
giving the litigants the fullest voice possible can individual dignity be preserved.”). 
 62. See id. at 312 (noting also that one danger of the court’s permitting parties to argue 
selfishly is that there is an incentive to distort or hide evidence). 
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individual’s interests.63  An adherence to the principles of individual 
responsibility in the adversary system implies that a person is responsible for 
the outcome of the trial.  The money he or she invests, the attorney he or she 
hires, the time invested and other factors all produce a verdict that the 
individual deserves based on his or her choices. 
This assumption of individual responsibility is similarly significant in the 
market system.  Individuals are considered the basic units of society; society is 
nothing more than the aggregate of individuals.64  The individual focuses on 
his own rights and utility, caring little about the interests of others apart from 
the ways in which society (other individuals) can help the individual increase 
his utility.65  The means to happiness (or utility) is consumption, and to 
consume more is better, as an individual is thereby able to increase his utility.  
Most importantly, the individual is responsible for his or her increase or 
decrease of utility; after all, he or she possesses the means to consume and 
produce.66 
Individual responsibility in the market system and the jury system is 
characterized by the presumption that the individual makes choices carefully 
and adroitly.67  In a market system, for example, an unemployed individual is 
 
 63. See Katherine R. Kruse, Lawyers Should Be Lawyers, but What Does That Mean?: A 
Response to Aiken & Wizner and Smith, 14 WASH. U. J.L. & POL’Y 49 (2004).  Kruse describes 
the role of lawyers as follows: 
Because they prioritize client autonomy, lawyers give significant deference to a client’s 
preferences on questions not relating directly to the lawyer’s legal expertise.  The ABA 
Model Rules of Professional Conduct codify the division of decisionmaking authority 
between lawyer and client by requiring that the lawyer “abide by the client’s decisions 
concerning the objectives of representation” and “consult with the client as to the means 
by which they are to be pursued.” 
Id. at 74–75 (quoting MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.2(a) (2002)); see also Robert F. 
Cochran, Jr., Crime, Confession, and the Counselor-at-Law: Lessons from Dostoyevsky, 35 
HOUS. L. REV. 327 (1998).  Cochran explains that this role of the deferring lawyer fits with his 
description of the “liberal lawyering model”: “[T]he lawyer is neutral, the autonomy of the client 
is the highest good, and the state procedure (i.e., the adversary system) is trusted to yield the 
good.”  Id. at 330; see also Janet Weinstein, And Never the Twain Shall Meet: The Best Interests 
of Children and the Adversary System, 52 U. MIAMI L. REV. 79, 90–91 (1997) (explaining that 
the idea that zealous advocacy is designed to protect the rights of the represented parties).  She 
states, “In a rights-based system, the client, as a separate and autonomous individual, is the 
subject of concern.  The lawyer cannot, according to principles of professional responsibility, do 
anything which would diminish the ‘rights’ of the client.”  Id. at 91. 
 64. See Werhane, supra note 29, at 188. 
 65. See id. 
 66. See id. at 188–89. 
 67. See id. at 188.  Citing the work of Herbert Spencer, Werhane expands the notion of 
choice in a market economy.  Id.  Individuals should be permitted to pursue their own ends, for 
individuals have much control over their own lives.  Werhane summarizes part of Spencer’s 
theory, stating: 
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presumed to look for a new job in a variety of locations, and in this sense 
eventually to choose where he will work.68  Consequently, when the market is 
left alone from governmental intervention, unemployment no longer remains a 
problem when individuals have the choice whether and where they want to be 
employed.69  These choices move prospective workers to locations where they 
benefit from receiving the highest returns, and society benefits from having 
employees deployed in their most productive locales.  The selfish ends of 
workers assist them and us, or so the market story goes.70  But individual 
 
[T]he evolution of the human being entails the development of complex mental abilities.  
Along with this mental development we have developed a notion of free will, thus we are 
able to direct our own individual destinies.  If particular societies should be left alone to 
evolve or devolve as they are fit, so too, the individual, who makes up the basic unit of 
any society, should be left alone to develop her resources and strengths. 
Id. 
 68. See Marianthi Rannia Leontaridi, Segmented Labour Markets: Theory and Evidence, 12 
J. ECON. SURVEYS 63, 64 (1998) (“Neo-classical theory assumes that individual workers can 
freely make a choice among a wide range of job options in the labour market, based upon their 
personal tastes, preferences, abilities and skills and thereby receive rewards on the basis of their 
human capital endowments.”). 
 69. See Gregory T. Papanikos, Methodological Individualism, Economic Behaviour and 
Economic Policy, 25 INT’L J. SOC. ECON. 1342, 1348 (1998) (citing the work of Friedrich 
Augustus Hayek). 
 70. See Werhane, supra note 29, at 188.  To ensure individuals’ abilities to pursue their own 
ends, a market system, according to Herbert Spencer, should resist government intervention.  Id. 
at 189–90.  In other words, a just society promotes individuals’ negative freedoms.  Id. at 188.  
As Werhane explains, 
  The ideal just society grants and protects equally these negative rights . . . . Every 
individual has the equal natural right to be left alone, the right not to be harmed or 
interfered with by others or by society.  As a result, individuals have the equal liberty to 
pursue their own ends as they are able and desirous of doing, so long as they do not 
interfere with others’ pursuits.  Importantly, freedom is the absence of restraints, not self-
determination. 
Id.  Spencer believes that a laissez-faire economy is best for society, meaning that the government 
should intervene only in rare instances, for a government’s intervening almost always poses a 
threat to the treasured individualism of a market economy.  Id. at 188–90.  Werhane characterizes 
Spencer’s theory in the following passage: 
  Spencer concludes that the best society is a laissez-faire private enterprise political 
economy with almost no government except to protect us from deliberately harming or 
interfering with each other.  A laissez-faire economy best permits individual 
entrepreneurial economic development where each individual can control her economic 
life and receive the full benefits of her labor, and industrialization, as Smith pointed out, 
creates economic growth and contributes to the positive social evolution of a political 
economy.  Indeed, he argues, community priorities supersede those of individuals only 
when rights are violated or in times of war.  Roads, schools, money, mail services, land, 
parks, and utilities should all be private; taxes should be the minimum possible, and, to 
borrow a phrase from Robert Nozick, government should be in the form of a “night 
watchman.” 
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responsibility is not only reflected in a market system through the actions of 
individuals, but also through the actions of corporations.  The purpose of a 
corporation is to “create and keep a consumer.”71  The corporations’ actions—
their attention to the needs and desires of individual consumers—will lead to 
increased sales and higher profits.  If they do not attend to those needs and 
desires, the negative consequences to their bottom line are deserved. 
A second assumption of the adversary system and the market system is 
equal power among participants.  In the adversary system, both parties in a 
dispute are assumed to have substantially equal power.  When both sides create 
and present their best arguments, while relying on the relevant facts and 
applying the rules of law, a judge or jury is expected to make the “right” 
decision.72  As previously discussed, the decision-maker is assumed to be 
neutral and passive, allowing the parties to control the packaging of their 
arguments.  Because each side is assumed to have equal opportunity for legal 
representation, resources, and a fair trial, the adversary system assumes that 
both parties have almost equal power.73  In theory, the party that presents the 
 
Id. at 189–90 (citing HERBERT SPENCER, MAN VERSUS THE STATE (1884); ROBERT NOZICK, 
ANARCHY, STATE, AND UTOPIA (1974)). 
 71. See Tevfik Dalgic, Dissemination of Market Orientation in Europe: A Conceptual and 
Historical Evaluation, 15 INT’L. MARKETING REV. 45, 45 (1998) (citing THEODORE LEVITT, THE 
MARKETING MODE (1969)).  As Dalgic stated: “Being market-led is about putting the customer at 
the top of the management agenda and list of priorities.  It is about focus on the customer, 
specializing on the customers’ unique needs, finding better ways of doing what the customer 
values, educating and informing the customer, commitment and care.”  Id. at 57. 
 72. See Sward, supra note 5, at 302 (“The adversary system is characterized by party control 
of the investigation and presentation of evidence and argument, and by a passive decision maker 
who merely listens to both sides and renders a decision based on what she has heard.”); see also 
id. at 316–17 (“When each side presents its best case, the decisionmaker has all the information 
he needs to reach a just result.  When presentation of the case is left in the hands of the parties, 
the information and motive-based rationales both suggest that each side will, indeed, present its 
best case.”). 
 73. See id. at 329.  Sward acknowledges that one of the primary assumptions of the 
adversary system is equality of power.  Id.  She states the following: 
The assumption of equality became part of the adversary system some time after it was 
recognized that magic could not determine victors.  If God does not decide who wins, the 
system must do so; but the system can do so only if the parties are equal—in resources, 
analytical skill, creativity, advocacy skill, and information. In other words, the adversary 
system itself is the magic that replaces God’s intervention.  Discovery is a subtle 
admission that the system does not do what it is intended to do. 
  . . . . 
  . . . Procedure came to be treated as a science—a methodology that, if done right, 
would enable a court to arrive at the right answer, whether the dispute was one of fact or 
one of law. 
Id. at 329, 354.  See contra Rubin, supra note 9, at 284. 
Both medieval and modern people know that in any commercial, or even proto-
commercial culture, the best champions will hire themselves out to the person who offers 
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best argument on the basis of the relevant facts and rules of law will be 
victorious.  Hence, justice is served when decision makers consider the 
arguments from both sides and render the court’s unbiased decision.74 
Similarly, the market system assumes equal power among individuals.  
Consistent with the ideals of individualism, mainstream economics assumes 
that individuals have equal power in terms of their choices.  The market, 
according to this theory, acts as a leveling device, allowing individuals to have 
equal access to a variety of goods.75  In some ways, this notion of equal power 
is similar to equality of opportunity; the market is open to everyone and 
individuals are permitted to pursue their selfish ends.76  No one individual or 
 
them the highest pay.  As a result, a person’s ability to prevail in a trial will be powerfully 
affected by their financial resources, regardless of the justice of their cause. . . . We know 
that a party’s chances of success are greatly improved by money and disastrously 
damaged by the lack of it. 
Id.; Carrie Menkel-Meadow, The Trouble with the Adversary System in a Post-modern, Multi-
cultural World, 1 J. INST. STUDY LEGAL ETHICS 49, 61 (1996). 
In litigation, the hierarchy of opposition will often be determined by the unequal resources 
of the parties. In its ideal and abstracted form the adversary system clearly contemplates 
adversaries of equal skill and economic support—the result should not depend on the 
resources, or “skill” of the argument’s representative, but on the merits of the argument, 
yet we all know “the haves come out ahead.” 
Id. (citations omitted). 
 74. Cf. David Barnhizer, The Virtue of Ordered Conflict: A Defense of the Adversary 
System, 79 NEB. L. REV. 657 (2000).  Although he does not explicitly discuss equality of power, 
Barnhizer seems to agree that the adversary system promotes this kind of equality, specifically in 
his discussion of balance.  Barnhizer believes that the adversary system achieves a state of 
balance with the conflicting claims of opposing parties despite the complexity of many of these 
claims.  Id.  Therefore, Barnhizer does more than just imply that parties have equal power; he also 
suggests that the adversary system equalizes previously unequal relations.  He asserts: “The 
adversary system is the mechanism by which we balance the inevitable and often healthy disputes 
between factions.”  Id. at 660. 
The legal system is not a self-contained theoretical construct of ideal justice, but reflects, 
diffuses, and balances competing claims for political and economic power.  In this vein, 
Roscoe Pound told us that “[c]onflict and competition and overlapping of men’s desires 
and demands and claims, in the formulation of what they take to be their reasonable 
expectations, require a systematic adjustment of relations, a reasoned ordering of conduct, 
if a politically organized society is to endure.” 
Id. at 662 (quoting Roscoe Pound, The Paths of Liberty, in NEW PATHS OF THE LAW 3 (1950)).  
“The adversary system is an integral tool through which our democracy achieves what Pound 
called ‘a systematic adjustment of relations.’”  Id. at 683 (quoting Pound, supra, at 3). 
 75. See Werhane, supra note 29, at 195 (noting that Adam Smith argued for this ideal of the 
market, stating, “Smith goes so far as to claim that the ideal is a ‘level playing field.’”) (citation 
omitted). 
 76. See id. at 189 (summarizing Spencer’s argument that “by granting the greatest equal 
freedom, each individual is free to pursue his or her own ends and achieve (or fail to achieve) 
happiness”); cf. Robert Sugden, Living with Unfairness: The Limits of Equal Opportunity in a 
Market Economy, 22 SOC. CHOICE & WELFARE 211, 211 (2004).  Sugden argues that there is a 
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group of elites has the power to decide what to produce.  Markets decide 
through the price mechanism and consumer sovereignty how to allocate goods 
in an efficient manner.77  Under this theory, known as the invisible hand, the 
selfish interests of aggregate individuals are channeled into the best allocation 
of limited resources, thus assuring that no one individual or small group 
possesses the majority of power.  In short, the market is in charge, promoting 
equal authority and strength among individuals (and corporations), in 
competitive markets.78 
 
conflict between the negative liberties of a market and the ideal of equality—in terms of power or 
opportunity.  Id. at 211–12.  Although he does not believe that the market achieves equality, he 
does explain the ideal notion of equality, as this equality relates to individuals’ opportunity and 
power.  He states, “The ideal is that every person should have an equally rich range of options 
from which to choose the life he actually leads.”  Id. at 211.  “[O]n grounds of justice or fairness, 
it is said, each person can legitimately demand the same amount of opportunity as other people 
enjoy, but what he does with those opportunities is up to him.”  Id. at 212. 
 77. See ROBERT KUTTNER, EVERYTHING FOR SALE: THE VIRTUES AND LIMITS OF 
MARKETS 11 (1996).  Kuttner describes the mainstream thinking of the “market’s magic,” 
stating, 
  At the very core of the market system is the price mechanism.  Prices indicate what 
millions of individual goods and services are “worth” to willing sellers and willing 
buyers.  Prices thereby function to apportion economic resources efficiently: they signal 
sellers what to produce; consumers what to buy; capitalists where to invest. 
  . . . . 
  . . . Markets, therefore, can claim to embody and express freedom of choice, as well 
as efficient allocation of scarce resources. 
Id.  But see Diane Elson, Labor Markets as Gendered Institutions: Equality, Efficiency and 
Empowerment Issues, 27 WORLD DEV. 611, 618 (1999). 
[F]ree markets only lead to the most efficient use of resources to satisfy human needs 
under very special conditions.  Unregulated labor markets could only guarantee the most 
effective use of labor if, among other things, all work were subject to a market-based 
calculus of costs and benefits; everyone in the markets were equally well informed and 
had complete knowledge about all possible characteristics of the labor force and all 
alternative uses of labor, both now and in the future; all uses of labor were renegotiable 
and reversible, so that “history doesn’t matter”; and all participants in the market were 
motivated to make the most effective use of labor.  Clearly, no real economy can ever 
meet these conditions and so the question of what arrangements are most conducive to 
efficient use of resources must ultimately be a matter of judgment and not a matter of 
mathematical proofs. . . . [W]e need to ask “costs for whom?” “efficiency for whom?” . . . 
  Neoclassical welfare economics rejects these questions in favor of definitions of 
efficiency which gloss over distributional questions, and gloss over the question of who 
has the power to define efficiency. 
Id. 
 78. Cf. Jesus M. Zaratiegui Labiano, A Reading of Hobbes’ Leviathan with Economists’ 
Glasses, 27 INT’L J. SOC. ECON. 134 (2000).  Although the author does not explicitly discuss 
equal power in his analysis of Hobbes’ ideas, he does suggest that individuals’ power is at the 
mercy of the market.  He writes, 
This is a society in which each participant competes with others to gain power. Each looks 
to take the powers of the others and avoid the transference of his to them, and this not by 
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A third assumption shared by the adversary system and market logic is the 
belief in rationality—a value intimately tied to individual responsibility.  In the 
adversary system, rationality leads to a just result in litigation, if the system 
works as intended.  For instance, when both parties present their best possible 
arguments to the neutral, rational decision-maker—the judge or jury—the 
decision-maker is expected to make the rational (and just) decision.79  Hence, 
the adversary system is relatively predictable; there are substantive rules 
governing individuals’ behavior, and there are procedural rules to which a 
judge is expected to adhere in litigation. The outcome is a decision arrived at in 
 
brute force but by an “operation of the market” that situates the value of each person in 
the measure he obtains it by his power. 
Id. at 143.  But see Eric Schutz, Markets and Power, 29 J. ECON. ISSUES 1147 (1995).  
Mainstream economics suggests: 
Regardless of how unequal they may be in other spheres of social life––family, polity, 
community, culture––people are equally free to choose among alternatives available in 
markets and to exit from the market sphere if they wish. . . . As a system of allocation 
then, a market economy amalgamates many individuals’ free choices into a coherent 
coordination of production and consumption without any major instances of domination 
by some over others––there is command, but it occurs in a roughly “democratic” 
aggregation of the preferred preferences of all market transactors.  There may remain 
great inequality of status in other spheres of human life, but the inexorable expansion of 
the market economy will provide an ever-widening space for the development of more 
congenial social relations. 
  Yet that vision depends on the supposition that people meet as equals in markets.  
They do not: even in the hypothetical world of “perfect” markets, people are unequally 
conferred with “prior property endowments” and hence are unequally subject to the need 
to work for subsistence.  Thus, some must work, while others need not, and the latter 
dominate the former . . . . 
Id. at 1165. 
 79. See Sward, supra note 5, at 313.  Sward argues that the impartial decision-maker 
contributes to the predictability in litigation, as both parties have the opportunity to present their 
evidence as convincingly as possible.  Id.  If the decision-maker were inquisitive, Sward suggests 
that the decision maker may not consider all relevant evidence, and thereby make a hasty and less 
rational decision.  Id.  However, the impartiality of the decision-maker promotes rationality in the 
adversary system, as this rationality is reflected in the predictability of a judge or jury’s decision.  
Sward explains, 
The passive decisionmaker may also help make the litigation more predictable: If the 
decisionmaker is confined to reasoning from admissible evidence presented by the parties 
in open court, the parties, who control the evidence, can predict the outcome somewhat 
better than if they must wait to see what inquiries the decisionmaker pursues. 
Id.  See contra Menkel-Meadow, supra note 73, at 50.  Menkel-Meadow disagrees with Sward’s 
conclusion that parties’ opposing arguments result in a rational and just outcome.  Instead, 
Menkel-Meadow asserts that this adversarial form of litigation actually impedes rationality.  Id.  
She writes, “Binary, oppositional presentations of facts in dispute is not the best way for us to 
learn the truth.  Polarized debate distorts truth, leaves out important information, simplifies 
complexity and obfuscates where it should clarify.”  Id. (footnotes omitted). 
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a rational manner.80  Similarly, the assumption that precedent will be applied in 
a rational manner produces a predictable outcome.  Cases with similar fact 
patterns should serve as maps for subsequent cases.81  In addition, discovery 
contributes to rationality in the adversary system.  When parties share more 
information before a trial, the facts are more clearly understood, from which 
the parties can create their legal arguments.82 
The market system also places a strong emphasis on practical rationality.  
To pursue clearly defined utility functions, consumers must possess and use 
abundant and accurate product information, or their decisions will be a 
measure of their ignorance as much as a reflection of what they truly desire.83  
 
 80. See Sward, supra note 5, at 309. 
  The second feature of fair adjudication is that the decision rendered by the court must 
have a rational basis.  There are elements of irrationality in all human institutions, of 
course, because we are not wholly rational beings. But predictability, which is a feature of 
rational decisionmaking, is essential to a fair system of adjudication. Our system of 
dispute resolution must be reasonably predictable, or people will not know how to order 
their affairs.  No legal system is perfectly deterministic, however, so predictability is 
never perfect. But people must be able to make some reasonable calculation of the likely 
legal effect of their actions. 
Id.  See contra Barnhizer, supra note 74, at 701.  Barnhizer does not believe that the legal process 
promotes rationality, as the process involves numerous complex factors.  He explains, 
Legal cases of any complexity are incompatible mixtures of fact, rationality, values, 
judgment, analogy, scientific assumption, metaphysics, and doctrinal principle. 
  It is within this context that the judge must exercise judgment to answer many 
questions that cannot be scientifically or rationally answered. The subject matter of legal 
doctrine involves factors that resist being compressed into conveniently rational 
compartments. These kinds of incommensurable and incompressible elements make up 
the core essences of the difficult doctrines through which we seek to balance and resolve 
our fundamental value conflicts. 
Id. 
 81. See Sward, supra note 5, at 324–26. 
Common law development is highly rational, moving step by step, analyzing small 
differences in cases and determining the likely social impact of a given decision. . . . The 
modern adversary system still has magical elements, but it is essentially a rational system.  
It depends on proof being presented by the two sides, and on a judge’s or jury’s power to 
reason from the evidence to a conclusion. 
  . . . . 
  . . . The “right” procedure will produce the “right” result. The system becomes God, 
and it is the system that is invoked to answer the substantive question about who should 
win. 
Id. 
 82. See id. at 327–29 (arguing that discovery, while the process contributes to rationality, is 
also an admission that the legal process involves the inequality of information; hence, discovery 
promotes greater rationality than what could be attained without this process). 
 83. But do consumers know what they desire and how to make decisions based on those 
desires?  Most economists are eager to defend the assumptions of rationality and independence of 
the consumer.  See, e.g., LIONEL ROBBINS, AN ESSAY ON THE NATURE & SIGNIFICANCE OF 
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Because individuals are interested in maximizing their utility, their most 
rational decisions are those decisions that increase their utility.84  For an 
individual to make a rational decision, he must evaluate the costs and benefits 
of various alternatives.85  These decisions require abundant prescience because 
an individual’s calculations must necessarily include consideration of future 
events.86  The most rational and motivated individual is able to make the best 
predictions, which results in his acquiring more wealth, allowing him to 
consume more, thereby increasing his utility.87  Successful market participants 
 
ECONOMIC SCIENCE 78–79 (2d ed. 1935) (“The main postulate of the theory of value is the fact 
that individuals can arrange their preferences in an order, and in fact do so. . . . We do not need 
controlled experiments to establish their validity: they are so much the stuff of our everyday 
experiences that they have only to be stated to be recognised as obvious.”); DOWNING, supra note 
2, at 422 (“The idea of irrational buyers or of impulsive buying behavior is a myth.”).  These 
claims supporting the rationality and independence of consumers are assumptions that are 
necessary for markets to be respected.  However, the assumptions are arguably tenuous and 
generally unsupported by social studies of human behavior. 
 84. See Leontaridi, supra note 68, at 63 (“Rational economic agents constantly strive to 
maximise their economic well-being.”). 
 85. See AMITAI ETZIONI, THE MORAL DIMENSION: TOWARD A NEW ECONOMICS 1 (1988) 
(“The neoclassical paradigm . . . . sees individuals as seeking to maximize their utility, rationally 
choosing the best means to serve their goals.  They are the decisionmaking units; that is, they 
render their own decisions.  The coming together of these individuals in the competitive 
marketplace, far from resulting in all-out conflict, is said to generate maximum efficiency and 
well-being.”). 
 86. See Dennis C. Mueller, Capitalism, Democracy, and Rational Individual Behavior, 10 J. 
EVOLUTIONARY ECON. 67 (2000).  Although Mueller disagrees with the neoclassical explanation 
of human behavior, he describes the neoclassical theory of rationality, stating, “The key 
behavioral assumption of neoclassical economics is, of course, that all individuals are rational 
egoists.”  Id. at 68.  He continues, 
  Rational agent models in their purest forms assume that individuals are forward 
looking optimizers correctly calculating which strategy promises the highest payoffs in 
each situation. When making a decision, each actor contemplates only the future payoffs 
from each possible action.  Past payoffs are relevant only to the extent that they help the 
forward-looking rational agent to accurately predict the future. 
Id. 
 87. See id. at 70 (“Consumers are rewarded with greater consumer’s surplus for each dollar 
spent, firms with greater profits.  In an unchanging environment market competition tends to 
maximize the rewards to consumers.”); see also Guo Ying Luo, Market Efficiency and Natural 
Selection in a Commodity Futures Market, 11 REV. FIN. STUD. 647, 647–648, 649 (1998) 
(explaining the common economic theory of informational efficiency, stating, “If traders are 
rational, in the sense that they maximize expected utility and form rational expectations, then 
informational efficiency can be achieved. . . . As more and more speculators enter the economy, 
at any point in time, whoever acts upon better predictions makes profit at the expense of his or her 
trading counterparts who act on less reliable predictions.”).  But see Herbert A. Simon, Barriers 
and Bounds to Rationality, 11 STRUCTURAL CHANGE AND ECON. DYNAMICS 243 (2000) (book 
review).  Simon disagrees with the mainstream theory of rationality, claiming instead that the 
mainstream notion of rationality is beyond our capabilities as humans.  Instead, there are 
“bounds” to our rationality, for human behavior includes a plethora of factors.  Id. at 251–53.  
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act on their expectations of what they think will occur in an economy and 
modify them regularly as new predictions reach their consciousness.88 
III.  ASSESSMENT OF SELECTED SHARED ASSUMPTIONS: THE QUALITY OF 
JURIES 
While a comprehensive evaluation of these shared assumptions is far 
beyond the scope of this Paper, the outline for such an appraisal is visible 
through an examination of the validity of the last of these shared assumptions.  
The adversarial legal system, like market ideology, is dependent on the 
assumption that decision-makers are rational.  But what if substantial evidence 
indicates that few jurors, the common arbiters of the adversary system, 
resemble the picture of a reasonable, unbiased thinker? 
How would we recognize a rational juror when we see her?  She would 
possess several characteristics: when deliberating with her fellow rational 
jurors, she would decide a verdict based solely on the evidence.  This ability 
depends on another assumption: that when listening to the adversaries 
throughout the trial, she would be able to recognize logos, rather than being 
unduly influenced by pathos and ethos.89  She must be able to understand, 
recall, and integrate evidence.  She would be able to reach a verdict with an 
appropriate understanding of the law and the judge’s instructions in the law.  
Does such an exemplary juror exist?  While legal commentators in the United 
States are generally friendly to the adversary system,90 data from studies of 
jury behavior91 are much less sanguine.92 
 
Simon contends that the complexity of human behavior creates difficulty in our having certainty 
with respect to such behavior and decision-making.  Id.  He concludes: 
There is not a unique valid model of human behavior, but a whole range of models, whose 
applicability may depend on the availability and cost of information, the intelligence, 
education, and patience of human actors, and goodness knows what other factors. Once 
one introduces into the SEU maximization Eden the snake of boundedness, it becomes 
difficult to find a univocal meaning of rationality, hence a unique theory of how people 
will, or should, decide. Economics, and social sciences generally, will never have the 
certainty of natural science. 
Id. at 251. 
 88. Papanikos, supra note 69, at 1347 (“[I]ndividual economic behaviour is a process of 
continuous planning.  Expectations, information and judgments play an important role and they 
have an important time dimension.”). 
 89. See generally LANE COOPER, THE RHETORIC OF ARISTOTLE 7–9 (1932).  These terms 
were coined by Aristotle to describe the art of rhetoric, or persuasion.  Logos is characterized as 
the logic of the argument (“the argument proper”); Pathos describes the emotional reaction the 
persuader is attempting to illicit from the listeners; Ethos is the character and history of the person 
persuading. 
 90. A recent article in the National Review provides an example of the common attitude of 
most supporters of the jury system.  See Theodore Dalrymple, Trial by Human Beings, NAT’L 
REV., Apr. 25, 2005, at 30, 31 (“The assault on juror objectivity is, at the bottom, a consequence 
of the dehumanization of man by sociological determinism.  It is an assault, if not quite on the 
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The first characteristic attributed to the “rational juror” is the ability to 
reach a verdict based solely on the evidence presented in trial.  In an ideal 
world, only admissible evidence would sway a jury.93  In reality, proponents of 
the jury system fail to recognize that rival causes may significantly influence 
 
possibility of rationality itself . . . at least an assault on the possibility of the rationality of the 
common man.”); see also NEIL VIDMAR, MEDICAL MALPRACTICE AND THE AMERICAN JURY: 
CONFRONTING THE MYTHS ABOUT JURY INCOMPETENCE, DEEP POCKETS, AND OUTRAGEOUS 
DAMAGE AWARDS 142 (1995) (“[M]ost jurors [have] a clear understanding of the adversary 
process and [evaluate] witnesses accordingly.”); Phoebe C. Ellsworth & Alan Reifman, Juror 
Comprehension and Public Policy: Perceived Problems and Proposed Solutions, 6 PSYCHOL. 
PUB. POL. AND L. 788, 788–89 (2000).  Ellsworth and Reifman note the generally unconcerned 
attitude of proponents of the jury system when social scientists recommended serious reforms: 
“‘[S]ocial science that is at odds with “common knowledge” is likely to be ignored’ and common 
knowledge was that juries were in no particular need of reform.”  Id. (citation omitted) (quoting J. 
Alexander Tanford, Law Reform by Courts, Legislatures, and Commissions Following Empirical 
Research on Jury Instructions, 25 L. & SOC’Y REV. 155, 167 (1991)); B. Michael Dann & Valerie 
P. Hans, Recent Evaluative Research on Jury Trial Innovations, 41 CT. REV. 12, 12 (2004). 
Traditional adversary jury trial procedures often appear to assume that jurors are blank 
slates, who will passively wait until the end of the trial and the start of jury deliberations 
to form opinions about the evidence.  However, we now know that jurors quite actively 
engage in evidence evaluation, developing their opinions as the trial progresses.  It makes 
sense to revise trial procedures so they take advantage of jurors’ decision-making 
tendencies and strengths. 
Id. 
 91. In this section of the Article, our evidence is primarily derived from studies in the fields 
of psychology and sociology.  For a more detailed description of the methods behind these 
studies, see Dann & Hans, supra note 90, at 12–13 (describing various approaches such as mock 
jury experiments, field experiments, and non-experimental studies). 
 92. See, e.g., Brief for Neil Vidmar et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting Respondents, Kumho 
Tire Co. v. Carmichael, 119 S.Ct. 1167 (1998) (No. 97-1709) (arguing that jurors have difficulty 
assessing statistical and economic evidence); JEFFREY O’CONNELL & C. BRIAN KELLY, THE 
BLAME GAME: INJURIES, INSURANCE, AND INJUSTICE 23–32 (1987) (arguing that juries are 
incompetent in assessing evidence).  But see Valerie P. Hans & Stephanie Albertson, Empirical 
Research and Civil Jury Reform, 78 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1497, 1500–09 (2003).  Hans and 
Albertson suggest that juries are perceived as incompetent, pro-plaintiff, and anti-business; 
however, they argue that the empirical evidence suggests that the problems with juries are 
overstated; but see also Richard Lempert, Civil Juries and Complex Cases: Taking Stock After 
Twelve Years, in VERDICT: ASSESSING THE CIVIL JURY SYSTEM 181, 223–35 (Robert Litan ed., 
1993); VIDMAR, supra note 90, at 175–82 (arguing that jurors’ verdicts in medical malpractice 
cases were generally defensible). 
 93. See Phoebe C. Ellsworth, Some Steps Between Attitudes and Verdicts, in INSIDE THE 
JUROR: THE PSYCHOLOGY OF JUROR DECISION MAKING 42, 61 (Reid Hastie ed., 1993) 
(“[W]e . . . know that juries are rarely unanimous on the first ballot, and thus, because the 
evidence is presented the same for all the jurors, individual differences must make a difference.  
The evidence presented is the same, but the evidence perceived by the jurors is not.”). 
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jurors’ decisions.94  These extralegal influences include the media,95 the 
personalities of the defendant and lawyers,96 the race, religion, and ethnic 
background of the defendant and the victim, and other compounding factors.  
Proponents of the jury system claim that these factors have little influence on 
the final decision of a jury.97  The following paragraphs will detail the social 
research debunking the claim that jurors are capable of reaching a verdict 
based exclusively on admissible information presented in court. 
While a juror is bound by law to carefully consider the evidence being 
presented, research indicates that it is far too easy for her to be swayed by a 
defendant’s good looks.  A study conducted by behavioral scientist Robert J. 
 
 94. See Jonathan D. Casper & Kennette M. Benedict, The Influence of Outcome Information 
and Attitudes on Juror Decision Making in Search and Seizure Cases, in INSIDE THE JUROR, THE 
PSYCHOLOGY OF JUROR DECISION MAKING, supra note 93, at 65, 65. The authors write, 
  A juror’s decision is the product of a complex set of factors including, at a minimum, 
the juror’s personal history, character, and social background; attitudes, ideologies and 
values; limits and proclivities of his or her cognitive processes; the nature of the evidence 
presented at trial; and legal rules that are supposed to govern the ways in which the 
evidence is interpreted, weighted, and applied to the decision. 
Id. 
 95. See Michael Chesterman, OJ and the Dingo: How Media Publicity Relating to Criminal 
Cases Tried by Jury Is Dealt with in Australia and America, 45 AM. J. COMP. L. 109, 124–31 
(1997) (detailing the lax methods by which the American legal system prevents and responds to 
the problem of juries’ encounters with prejudicial publicity). 
 96. See David L. Wiley, Comment, Beauty and the Beast: Physical Appearance 
Discrimination in American Criminal Trials, 27 ST. MARY’S L.J. 193, 211–14, 233 (1995) 
(considering how jurors discriminate according to physical appearance and arguing that remedies 
should be made to ensure that defendants are judged on their actions rather than their 
appearance). 
 97. But see ROBERT B. CIALDINI, INFLUENCE: THE PSYCHOLOGY OF PERSUASION (1993). 
Cialdini argues that the principles of social proof and liking serve as two powerful tools that 
affect an individual’s response to certain situations.  Id. at 116.  Cialdini asserts that to some 
extent an individual determines what is correct by finding out what other people view as correct. 
Id.  Thus, it follows that if a reporter interviews five people about a murder trial on the local news 
and all five say that they think the defendant is guilty, then a potential juror who sees the 
interview may be predisposed to think that the defendant is guilty before hearing the evidence. 
Additionally, Cialdini asserts that individuals tend to “like” physically attractive individuals and 
individuals who are socially similar to themselves.  Id. at 171–72.  If this assertion is true, then it 
would follow that a physically attractive, well-dressed defendant with a background similar to the 
juror’s backgrounds would be more likely to be acquitted than an unattractive, dissimilar 
defendant, even if the same evidence had been presented. 
  See also Linda A. Foley & Minor H. Chamblin, The Effect of Race and Personality on 
Mock Jurors’ Decisions, 112 J. OF PSYCHOL. 47 (1982).  Foley and Chamblin conducted a study 
exploring juror responses to different types of defendants and victims in a mock trial setting.  Id.  
Foley and Chamblin conclude that similarity of the defendant to the juror and the predispositions 
of the juror have significant effects on a juror’s determination of guilt or innocence.  Id. at 48–50.  
If the results of this case study are true, then one could conclude that factors other than the 
evidence influence a juror’s decision. 
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MacCoun substantiates this point.  MacCoun found that in close cases, mock 
juries are significantly more likely to acquit the defendant when that person is 
physically attractive than when the defendant is physically unattractive.98  In 
addition, he found that individual jurors became more lenient toward attractive 
defendants than toward unattractive defendants during deliberation.99  In close 
cases involving attractive defendants, “jurors favoring acquittal tend to be 
more influential than jurors favoring conviction.”100  In cases with unattractive 
defendants, jurors were just as likely to convict as to acquit.101  What possible 
link is there between (1) the logic and evidence presented on behalf of a 
defendant and (2) the physical attractiveness of the defendant?  If there is such 
a connection, it is well hidden.  Because a person’s attractiveness is not 
relevant to a legal decision, yet influences juries, MacCoun’s research suggests 
that believing juries are rational is a tenuous assumption at best. 
The defendant’s appearance and demeanor are not the only extralegal 
influences that affect a jury.  The charming smile of the person who defends 
him is unduly important as well.102 Research conducted by psychologists 
Martin F. Kaplan and Lynn E. Miller examines the influence of the behavior 
and appearance of the attorney on the jurors’ decision-making.103  They found 
that mock jurors were more likely to find the defendant guilty when his 
attorney was annoying or obnoxious than when the prosecutor exhibited the 
same traits.104  When both lawyers were inoffensive, the jury was not 
 
 98. Robert J. MacCoun, The Emergence of Extralegal Bias During Jury Deliberation, 17 
CRIM. JUST. & BEHAV. 303, 311 (1990); see also HARRY KALVEN, JR. & HANS ZEISEL, THE 
AMERICAN JURY 193–218 (1966).  In another study of forty-four cases of spousal homicide in 
which the judge convicted the defendant, Kalven and Zeisel found that the sex of the defendant 
played a significant role in determining the jury’s verdict.  Id. at 202.  In these cases, the jury 
convicted male defendants 82% of the time, while it convicted female defendants only 59% of the 
time.  Id.  These researchers also concluded that juries are more likely to acquit defendants when 
they are very young or very old, attractive, remorseful, or when they are military veterans.  Id. at 
202–05, 207. 
 99. MacCoun, supra note 98, at 311–12. 
 100. Id. at 311. 
 101. Id. 
 102. This is contrary to the assumptions of jury system proponents who hold opinions like the 
following: “[I]ndividual [attorney] attributes like style or personality do not seem to matter as 
much as is suggested in the trial advocacy literature . . . . [J]urors pay more attention to 
substantive aspects of the trial—the nature of testimony by witnesses and how they withstand 
cross-examination.”  Shari Seidman Diamond et al., Juror Reactions to Attorneys at Trial, 87 J. 
CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 17, 43 (1996).  If attorney style or personality affects jurors’ verdicts, 
then juries do not render decisions based on the evidence presented during the trial.  If juries are 
to be respected, claims like the one above must be accurate.  The evidence indicates otherwise. 
 103. Martin F. Kaplan & Lynn E. Miller, Reducing the Effects of Juror Bias, 36 J. 
PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 1443 (1978). 
 104. Id. at 1451–52. 
SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW 
2006] THE SHARED ASSUMPTIONS 453 
affected.105  Legally, the level of obnoxiousness of a person’s attorney should 
not be a deciding factor in a case.  But the evidence suggests that it is. 
The active participants in a trial—the attorneys and witnesses—are not the 
only means of confusion to a jury.  The attitudes and habits of the jurors 
themselves may also affect their ability to produce a verdict based solely on 
admissible evidence.  A jury is composed of a group of individuals, not twelve 
identical John Does.106  Because individual jurors vary in their levels of moral 
and intellectual development,107 it is unreasonable to assume that jurors make 
verdicts based solely on evidence.  For instance, a factor influencing some 
jurors is their inability to suspend emotional involvement108 and personal 
biases to arrive at a conclusion.  The Supreme Court itself has recognized the 
differing levels of ability in people when it noted that citizens, as voters, have 
differing levels of engagement as well as varying decision-making abilities.109  
Moreover, a low level of intellectual development may negatively affect a 
 
 105. Id. 
 106. See Donna Shestowsky, Improving Summary Jury Trials: Insights from Psychology, 18 
OHIO ST. J. ON DISP. RESOL. 469, 477–79 (2003).  When describing the benefits of multiple 
summary jury trials (abbreviated mock trials used to come to settlements), Shestowsky states, 
“[T]he unique personalities and biases of the jurors deciding the case are especially likely to 
impact jury outcomes.”  Id. at 478. 
 107. MORRIS E. CHAFETZ, THE TYRANNY OF EXPERTS: BLOWING THE WHISTLE ON THE 
CULT OF EXPERTISE 117–18 (1996). 
[A]mong 170 million adult Americans, 27 million read below the fifth-grade level.  Some 
60 to 65 million read below the ninth grade level.  To comprehend public policy 
discussions on the op-ed pages of the New York Times, the Washington Post, or the Wall 
Street Journal, a reader needs at least a twelfth-grade reading level.  In other words, 
nearly two out of five Americans are ill-equipped to participate fully in public life.  They 
do not have the resources available to them should they wish to question the scientists and 
would-be prognosticators. 
Id.  But see Michael B. Lupfer et al., The Influence of Level of Moral Reasoning on the Decisions 
of Jurors, 127 J. SOC. PSYCHOL. 653 (1986) (finding close connection between a juror’s level of 
“moral reasoning,” as determined by Rest’s Defining Issues Test, and his or her decision to acquit 
or convict). 
 108. Contra Little, supra note 28.  Little argues that “the role of emotions in adjudication 
is . . . no longer a subversive enterprise, but one consistent with the dominant canons in legal 
scholarship.”  Id. at 205.  She goes on to detail how emotions such as empathy, loyalty, jealousy, 
and disgust can play a substantive role in adjudication.  Id. at 208–18.  However, when describing 
each emotion and its potential benefits, she makes the important concession regarding the 
dangerous implications of these emotions gone awry in the courtroom, as they often do.  Id. 
 109. See Daniel R. Ortiz, The Engaged and the Inert: Theorizing Political Personality Under 
the First Amendment, 81 VA. L. REV. 1, 4 (1995) (arguing that the Supreme Court has two 
different views of voters’ behavior: civic slobs and civic smarties.  Civic slobs “are passive and 
uninformed.  They do not bother to acquire and evaluate the same kinds or amounts of political 
information but instead vote largely on the basis of images, feelings, and emotions.  Cognitive 
deliberation plays a limited role in political choice under the civic slob model.”). 
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juror’s ability to pay attention to evidence, especially during a long trial.110  A 
juror’s unique experiences, ranging anywhere from having read a relevant 
article to having a victim in the family, or even having a family at all, 
influences a juror’s perception of the facts of the case.111  Additionally, a juror 
will emphasize evidence consistent with her own views and attitudes while she 
will discount or ignore evidence inconsistent with her attitudes.112 
Ceteris paribus, jurors are above all individuals, and as such are affected 
by their own biases.  However, if a jury is composed of a representative sample 
of the community, these biases should be largely compensated for by other 
jurors.113  Unfortunately, lawyers complicate the situation by intentionally 
 
 110. See Ellsworth, supra note 93, at 42–43.  “[M]any trials are long and any given juror’s 
level of attention is likely to vary considerably.”  Id. at 42.  Ellsworth suggests that because 
different jurors will be attentive or inattentive to particular parts of a witness’s testimony, the 
final impression of the testimony will vary.  Id.  “As an academic, for example, I will probably be 
especially attentive to the testimony of experts, particularly other psychologists, while the 
attention of my fellow jurors may wander.  When it comes to testimony about the identity and 
trajectory of a bullet, a hunter may be a more attentive witness than I.”  Id. at 42–43; see also 
JAMES P. LEVINE, JURIES AND POLITICS 12 (1992). 
The trial ran from April 1987 to January 1990, and featured testimony from 124 
witnesses, produced 800 exhibits, and included reels of videotaped interviews with the 
children who described their experiences.  It resulted in 60,000 pages of transcripts and 
cost the taxpayers $13 million.  And where did this copious outpouring of information 
leave jurors?  One juror said, “When I went into the jury room I was as confused and 
uncertain as I was on the first day of the trial.”  The jury could not reach agreement, and 
after another trial a second jury deadlocked.  One frustrated juror stated “I felt like I went 
in there [the jury room] with more questions than evidence.” 
Id. (citations omitted). 
 111. Ellsworth, supra note 93, at 47–48.  Ellsworth states, 
Our observations suggest that jurors concentrate on comprehending trial events, 
constructing a fact sequence, evaluating credibility, and relating the evidence to a legal 
category.  However, they do not seem to spend a great deal of time trying to define the 
legal categories, evaluating the admissibility of evidence they are using, or testing their 
final conclusions against a standard of proof.  In fact, many jurors simply appear to select 
a sketchy stereotyped theme to summarize what happened (e.g., “cold-hearted killer plots 
revenge,” “nice guy panics and overreacts”) and then choose a verdict on the basis of the 
severity of the crime as they perceive it. 
Id.    
 112. See Loren J. Chapman & Jean P. Chapman, Genesis of Popular but Erroneous 
Psychodiagnostic Observations, 72 J. ABNORMAL PSYCHOL. 193, 193 (1967) (suggesting that 
ambiguous or incomplete information will be interpreted in a manner consistent with the person’s 
initial attitudes and expectations); see also Ellsworth, supra note 93, at 50.  For example, 
Ellsworth suggests that jurors in favor of the death penalty evaluate evidence in a manner more 
favorable to the prosecution than do jurors opposed to the death penalty.  Id. 
 113. That jurors are a representative sample of the community is an entirely separate tenuous 
assumption.  To further examine the instability of that assumption, see James M. Gleason & 
Victor A. Harris, Race, Socio-Economic Status, and Perceived Similarity as Determinants of 
Judgements by Simulated Jurors, 3 SOC. BEHAV. & PERSONALITY 175, 179–80 (1975).  But cf. 
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selecting unrepresentative jurors in the voir dire process.  Knowing that 
similarity in race, gender, religious belief, socioeconomic status,114 and the 
ability to empathize with either the defendant or the victim can subconsciously 
cloud a member of the jury’s ability to reason,115 attorneys seek jurors most 
favorable for their side.116  In other words, winning a jury trial does not 
necessarily depend on presenting the most convincing evidence to a jury; 
rather the attorney must present the evidence to the right jury, i.e., her client’s 
ideal jury.117 Selecting the ideal juror through purposeful qualification or 
 
Heather K. Gerken, Second-Order Diversity, 118 HARV. L. REV. 1099, 1104 (2005) (detailing an 
argument not just for proportional minority representation in juries but an even more extensive 
inclusion of minorities in the institution). 
 114. See Rob Walters et al., Are We Getting a Jury of Our Peers? 68 TEX. B.J. 144, 145–46 
(2005), for a description of the lack of diverse socioeconomic representation in the state that 
provides the least compensation for jurors: Texas.  The organizer of a study on jury diversity 
stated, “It is literally true that we have certain segments of our society who have to make a 
choice: Do they fulfill their constitutional obligation to be a juror or do they go to work so they 
can barely make enough money to pay the rent and feed their children?”  Id. at 146.  See 
generally Evan R. Seamone, A Refreshing Jury COLA: Fulfilling the Duty to Compensate Jurors 
Adequately, 5 N.Y.U. J. LEGIS. & PUB. POL’Y 289 (2002) (discussing the current status and 
history of jury compensation).  Seamone then presents an argument for an increase in jury 
compensation with elements consistent with the previous citation: an increase in compensation 
would create a more economically representative jury pool.  Id. at 369–72. 
 115. VALERIE P. HANS & NEIL VIDMAR, JUDGING THE JURY 133 (1986); see, e.g., CASS R. 
SUNSTEIN, FREE MARKETS AND SOCIAL JUSTICE 4 (1997) (suggesting that social norms and 
irrationality affect decision making).  “People’s choices are a function of the distinctive social 
role in which they find themselves, and we may act irrationally or quasi-rationally.”  Id. at 7. 
 116. See Ellsworth & Reifman, supra note 90, at 792.  We expect the voir dire process to 
expel “bad jurors.”  “The problems with the jury system are blamed on the inclusion of bad 
jurors, whose misbehavior subverts an otherwise admirable system, or, in the words of Judge 
James Rant, ‘the obstinate loner, the obsessive individual, the morally-challenged individual.’” 
Id. (citations omitted).  However, instead of expelling these “bad jurors,” voir dire is used to 
include them.  “[A]ttorneys are not using voir dire to identify and challenge biased jurors but to 
identify and challenge the intelligent, rational, and unbiased jurors in an effort to ‘hand pick’ 
juries that will favor their side.”  Id. at 793.  Alas, the authors seem to suggest that it is by no 
mistake that bad jurors find themselves on juries. 
 117. See, e.g., Constance L. Hays & Leslie Eaton, Martha Stewart, Near Trial, Arranges Her 
Image, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 20, 2004, at A1. 
  Long before Martha Stewart steps into a courtroom today to watch the selection of a 
jury for her federal trial, she and her legal team will have carefully tested the 
government’s case—and her own reputation—before a sampling of the kind of people 
who will be deciding her fate. 
  At one point last fall, jury experts and public relations advisers convened focus 
groups in Manhattan on Ms. Stewart’s behalf to assess reactions to her accusations against 
her while her lawyer looked on.  The focus groups were part of a million-dollar campaign 
that also includes polling, a Web site devoted to her side of the story, and two carefully 
planned television interviews that allowed Ms. Stewart to proclaim her innocence to 
larger audiences. 
Id. 
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disqualification from jury duty has contributed to numerous instances of 
unrepresentative juries and consequently increased the weight of this slight 
flaw.118 
So, based on the powerful effect of external factors influencing a verdict, 
the assumption that juries decide verdicts based exclusively on evidence and 
argumentation is highly questionable.  Even if every juror decided a verdict 
based only on the evidence, they still would not be the rational jurors the 
adversary system requires for effectiveness.  Proponents of the adversary 
system also must assume that jurors can understand, recall, and integrate the 
evidence presented in the courtroom.  The following paragraphs will address 
each of these three requirements for interpreting evidence in turn.  This 
analysis will suggest how each assumption—the ability to understand, ability 
to recall, and ability to integrate—is quite simply not supported by relevant 
evidence from the social sciences. 
First, proponents of the adversary system assume that jurors understand the 
evidence presented in a courtroom.119  Consider the following scenario.  In a 
patent case, a lawyer shows the jury blueprints that the defendant claims are 
the originals.  The average juror—a nurse, a high school math teacher, a 
retiree—has no training in blueprint authenticity.  Only an individual trained in 
 
 118. See, e.g., Walter F. Becker, Jr., How to Use a Jury Consultant: A Guide for Trial 
Attorneys, 50 LA. B.J. 426 (2003). 
  Jury research assists the trial attorney in two basic ways.  First, it tests how jurors are 
likely to react to the case so that the attorney can develop trial themes accordingly.  
Second, it identifies jurors who possess attitudes, experiences, and beliefs which will 
resist, oppose or reject the attorney’s theory of the case. 
Id. at 426.  For example: 
  In the Birmingham bombing case, jury research by jury consultants working for the 
prosecution revealed that potential jurors who strongly supported Dr. Martin Luther 
King’s birthday as a national holiday or who had visited the 16th Street Baptist Church or 
who had seen Spike Lee’s movie Four Little Girls tended to favor the prosecution. 
  By contrast, in the O.J. Simpson criminal case, jury research revealed that potential 
jurors who did not read the newspaper regularly, or got most of their news from tabloid 
news, tended to favor the defense. 
Id. at 428. 
 119. “[T]here is nothing so extraordinary in many of the cases that most or all of a group of 
12 laypersons could not understand them.”  VIDMAR, supra note 90, at 143.  “Jurors, if properly 
instructed and treated with deserved respect, bring collective intelligence, wisdom, and a 
dedication to their tasks, which is rarely equaled in other areas of public service.”  In re U.S. 
Financial Securities Litigation, 609 F.2d 411, 430 (1979).  “[W]e do not believe any case is so 
overwhelmingly complex that it is beyond the abilities of a jury.”  Id. at 432. 
  If evidence at a trial is too complex for jurors to understand, then they cannot render a 
verdict in favor of the party presenting the strongest evidence.  They must instead base their 
judgment on irrelevant and unpredictable factors.  But verdicts in favor of the party presenting the 
strongest evidence are exactly what arguments for juries purport to offer.  Hence, these claims 
must be accurate for juries to be respected.  A panoply of social studies, however, denounce the 
claims as inaccurate. 
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identifying original blueprints could accurately interpret the evidence.120  
Hence, without training in specific areas, members of a jury could potentially 
have difficulty separating the truth and misleading evidence just as the 
untrained consumer has difficulty identifying counterfeit money that a trained 
financial security agent could identify immediately.121 
Similar evidence of the inability of jurors to understand evidence in a 
courtroom is provided by varied social studies indicating the inappropriate 
influence of expert witnesses. These studies indicate that juries are influenced 
not by what the experts say, but rather how they say it.  Psychologists Irwin A. 
Horowitz, Kenneth S. Bordens, Elizabeth Victor, Martin J. Bourgeois, and 
Lynne ForsterLee found, for example, that the technicality of language used in 
expert witness testimony had a significant positive effect on mock jurors’ 
perceptions of their credibility.122  The researchers also found that, somewhat 
fortuitously, when the evidence clearly favored the plaintiff, increasing the 
technicality of the language in expert witnesses’ testimony increased the 
likelihood that mock jurors would produce a verdict in favor of the plaintiff.123  
Because the technicality of expert witnesses’ language, independent of the 
content of their testimony, is logically irrelevant to the facts of the case, the 
researchers’ work raises serious questions about jurors’ cognitive functioning. 
The inappropriate influence of expert testimony was again exposed 
through the research of psychologists Gretchen B. Chapman and Brian H. 
Bornstein.  In civil cases, the researchers found that jurors’ numerical 
judgments are excessively influenced by arbitrary numbers presented to 
them.124  As the monetary damages requested by the plaintiff increased, the 
 
 120. See Ross v. Bernhard, 396 U.S. 531, 538 n.10 (1970).  See generally Jennifer F. Miller, 
Comment, Should Juries Hear Complex Patent Cases?, 2004 DUKE L. & TECH. REV. 4, ¶44 
(2004), http://www.law.duke.edu/journals/dltr/articles/2004dltr0004.html (questioning whether a 
jury could understand complex legal issues within the confines of a trial). 
 121. See SAUL M. KASSIN & LAWRENCE S. WRIGHTSMAN, THE AMERICAN JURY ON TRIAL: 
PSYCHOLOGICAL PERSPECTIVES 129–31 (1988).  As Kassin and Wrightsman detail, the inability 
to understand evidence is substantiated by the restrictions on jurors to ask clarification questions.  
Id.  Compare Judge John R. Stegner, Why I Let Jurors Ask Questions in Criminal Trials, 40 
IDAHO L. REV. 541 (2004), with Judge N. Randy Smith, Why I Do Not Let Jurors Ask Questions 
in Trials, 40 IDAHO L. REV. 553 (2004) (detailing the common arguments for increasing juror 
understanding in situations such as the one described above by allowing them to ask clarification 
questions).  See also Dann & Hans, supra note 90, at 15. 
 122. Irwin A. Horowitz, Kenneth S. Bordens, Elizabeth Victor, Martin J. Bourgeois, & Lynne 
ForsterLee, The Effects of Complexity on Jurors’ Verdicts and Construction of Evidence, 86 J. 
APPLIED PSYCHOL. 641, 649 (2001). 
 123. Id. 
 124. Gretchen B. Chapman & Brian H. Bornstein, The More You Ask for, the More You Get: 
Anchoring in Personal Injury Verdicts, 10 APPLIED COGNITIVE PSYCHOL. 519, 538 (1996) . 
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compensation awarded by the mock jurors increased.125  Psychologists Allan 
Raitz, Edith Greene, Jane Goodman, and Elizabeth F. Loftus found that mock 
jurors consistently match the figures suggested by expert witnesses when 
determining damages.126  They found that nearly half of mock jurors awarded a 
damage amount which exactly matched the amount suggested by experts who 
testified for the plaintiff.127  Another scholar, J.J. Zuehl, conducted a mock 
juror study in which he varied the monetary amount of damages requested but 
kept the facts of the case constant.128  He found that the damages awarded 
closely matched the damage requests, even when the damage requests varied 
greatly.129  If jurors were able to understand evidence, as the adversary system 
assumes, then the suggestions of the expert witnesses would not be so 
powerful. 
A final example of the improper influence of expert witnesses is noted in 
the research of psychologists Saul M. Kassin, Lorri N. Williams, and Courtney 
L. Saunders.  Their study found that mock jurors’ views of expert witnesses 
were influenced by the negative implications of baseless, yet incriminating, 
cross-examination questions.130  These results persisted even when the 
witness’s attorney objected to the question, even when the witness denied the 
implications, and even when the jurors claimed that they did not believe the 
 
 125. Id. at 526–27.  It is important to note that we are not arguing that jurors are especially 
prone to these or any cognitive errors.  Rather, human beings are all susceptible to deficiencies in 
judgment.  See Rachlinski, supra note 3, at 61–66. 
  The human brain is extremely efficient, but it is not a computer.  The brain has a 
limited ability to process information but must manage a complex array of stimuli.  In 
response to its natural constraints the brain uses shortcuts that allow it to perform well 
under most circumstances.  Reliance on these shortcuts, however, leaves people 
susceptible to all manner of illusions: visual, mnemonic, and judgmental. 
Id. at 61 (citations omitted); see also Samuel N. Fraidin, Duty of Care Jurisprudence: Comparing 
Judicial Intuition and Social Psychology Research, 38 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1, 1–2 (2004).  This 
article describes the legal action that ought to be taken when corporate directors seemingly violate 
“duty of care” legislation that requires directors to make informed and careful decisions.  Id.  
Many of the same expectations placed on jurors are also placed on well-educated corporate 
directors, and many of the same reforms have been discouraged—such as note-taking and 
question-asking—and the result has been equivalent.  Id.  In the same vein of Rachlinski, if 
educated corporate directors struggle with rational decision-making, what can we expect from 
juries? 
 126. Allan Raitz, Edith Greene, Jane Goodman & Elizabeth F. Loftus, Determining Damages: 
The Influence of Expert Testimony on Jurors’ Decision Making, 14 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 385, 
393 (1990). 
 127. Id. at 390. 
 128. Id. at 387 (citing J.J. Zuehl, The Ad Damnum, Jury Instructions, and Personal Injury 
Damage Awards (1982) (unpublished manuscript, on file with the University of Chicago)). 
 129. Id. (citing Zuehl, supra note 128). 
 130. Saul M. Kassin, Lorri N. Williams, & Courtney L. Saunders, Dirty Tricks of Cross-
Examination: The Influence of Conjectural Evidence on the Jury, 14 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 373, 
378 (1990). 
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implications.131  In short, these observations are significant because the 
baseless negative implications of cross-examination questions are logically 
irrelevant to expert witnesses’ credentials and testimony.  The crossing 
attorney’s tactic of asking irrelevant or unfounded questions serves to distract 
the jury from the goal: coming to a verdict based on admissible evidence from 
credible witnesses.  Unfortunately, the tactic often works. 
Expert witnesses are not the only witnesses who confuse juries, 
incapacitating their ability to understand the evidence.  The very existence of 
an eyewitness, regardless of the accuracy of his or her testimony, improves the 
odds of a prosecutorial victory. 
The work of psychologist Elizabeth Loftus found that mock jurors rely too 
heavily on the testimony of eyewitnesses.132  Her research details scenarios 
when no eyewitness was provided to confirm the defendant’s guilt and mock 
jurors found the defendant guilty just 18% of the time.133  Take the same case 
and add one eyewitness who confirms the defendant’s guilt.  Then the jurors 
found the defendant guilty 72% of the time.134  The problem, according to 
Loftus, is that even when overwhelming evidence was presented that 
discredited the eyewitness, mock jurors nevertheless returned guilty verdicts 
68% of the time.135  Loftus critiques jurors’ behavior by concluding that they 
rely too heavily on eyewitness testimony.136  If the assumption that jurors 
accurately understand the evidence were true, then a discredited eyewitness 
should have the same logical effect on the case as no eyewitness at all.  
However, as Loftus’ research indicates, this outcome is but wishful thinking in 
actual jury practice. 
Jurors often are confused by witness testimony; they cannot distinguish 
between what is logically relevant and irrelevant, thereby inhibiting their 
ability to understand evidence presented at a trial.  Even more disturbing, 
though, is that even if they did understand, jurors cannot recall the evidence, 
despite the assumption of proponents of the jury system that jurors are indeed 
able to recall.  Because of the limitations of the human brain relating to neuron 
firing and information processing, physiologists estimate that only 1% of all 
the information that comes into a person’s consciousness is stored as long-term 
memory.137  This biological estimation indicates that if no juror took notes on 
 
 131. Id. 
 132. Elizabeth Loftus, Reconstructing Memory: The Incredible Eyewitness, PSYCHOL. 
TODAY, Dec. 1974, at 116, 117–18. 
 133. Id. at 118. 
 134. Id. 
 135. Id. 
 136. Id. at 119. 
 137. GERARD J. TORTORA & SANDRA REYNOLDS GRABOWSKI, PRINCIPLES OF ANATOMY 
AND PHYSIOLOGY 520 (10th ed. 2003). 
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the evidence presented,138 and if each juror could recall and analyze 1% of the 
evidence presented each day, then collectively the jury may only discuss a 
small portion of what was presented in the courtroom.139  This estimation 
discredits the assumption that jury decisions are based on complete and 
accurate evidence presented during the trial. 
Even if jurors were able to fully understand and recall all of the evidence 
from an extensive and complicated trial, they still lack the ability to integrate 
the evidence into an appropriate ruling.140  This ability is yet another tenuous 
assumption made about juries.  One example of the inaccuracy of this 
assumption is the tendency to be influenced by inadmissible evidence when 
deciding a case.  The experiments of psychologists Saul M. Kassin and Holly 
Sukel note the tendency of jurors to be affected by hindsight bias.141  They 
found that mock jurors were more likely to convict a defendant on trial for 
murder when the trial contained a confession ruled inadmissible by the judge 
 
 138. See KASSIN & WRIGHTSMAN, supra note 121, at 128 (“[O]ne wonders how much of the 
proceedings jurors can possibly recall with or without the aid of taking notes.”); Terry Carter, The 
Verdict on Juries, ABA J., Apr. 2005, at 41 (“More states are adopting jury reforms, freeing 
jurors to take notes and ask questions.  But some judges are slow to embrace the changes.”).  The 
American Bar Association now strongly recommends that “[j]urors should be instructed at the 
beginning of the trial that they are permitted, but not required, to take notes in aid of their 
memory of the evidence . . . .”  Id. at 44.  The Bar Association also recommend that jurors receive 
“trial notebooks” that include “the court’s preliminary instructions, and certain exhibits and 
stipulations.”  Id.  Carter reports that only half of the courtrooms in the country allow jurors to 
take notes.  Id.; see also Dann & Hans, supra note 90, at 13–14, 16–17; cf. Shari Seidman 
Diamond et al., Juror Discussions During Civil Trials: Studying an Arizona Innovation, 45 ARIZ. 
L. REV. 1, 4 (2003) (describing a controversial and experimental way to encourage recollection 
among jurors: allowing jurors permission to discuss the trial during recesses); Dann & Hans, 
supra note 90, at 17–18. 
 139. See Ellsworth & Reifman, supra note 90, at 790.  The severity of this problem increases 
significantly when one takes into account the type of information recalled.  In this segment of the 
article, the authors describe another flaw in memory that inhibits jurors from recalling evidence 
accurately: the mind has a tendency to remember a few descriptive examples more than other 
varieties of evidence.  Id.  In other words, “vivid, unreliable information is more persuasive than 
the boring, reliable information.”  Id.  So 1% of information recalled during deliberations may 
only be the flashy examples, not the legally substantive aspects of the case. 
 140. Id. at 790–93. 
 141. Saul M. Kassin & Holly Sukel, Coerced Confessions and the Jury: An Experimental Test 
of the “Harmless Error” Rule, 21 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 27, 30–31 (1997); see also Baruch 
Fischhoff, Hindsight ≠ Foresight: The Effect of Outcome Knowledge on Judgment Under 
Uncertainty, 1 J. EXPERIMENTAL PSYCHOL.: HUM. PERCEPTION & PERFORMANCE 288 (1975). 
Fischhoff found that individuals supplied with information about the outcome of an event 
overestimate what they would have known about the context of the situation had they not been 
supplied with the outcome information.  Id. at 292.  In addition, Fischhoff found that individuals 
supplied with outcome information overestimate what other individuals without outcome 
information knew.  Id. at 297. 
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than when they heard no confession.142  This higher conviction rate persisted 
even when jurors saw the confession as coerced,143 even when it was stricken 
from the record, and even when jurors said it had no influence.144  Legally, the 
confession had no weight, but de facto, the confession decided the case. 
The research of psychologists Edith Greene, Michael Johns, and Alison 
Smith support the argument that juries cannot effectively integrate evidence 
into a ruling.145  In civil cases, damage awards ought to be compensation for 
the plaintiff, not punishment for the defendant.  However, their evidence 
suggests that mock jurors do not appropriately separate the defendant’s 
conduct from their compensatory damage awards.146  They found that, in mock 
jury trials, the reprehensibility of the defendant’s conduct inappropriately 
influenced jurors’ assessments of the plaintiff’s harm.147  Similarly, they found 
that jurors who heard evidence about the defendant’s conduct gave larger 
monetary awards to the plaintiff than jurors who had no evidence of the 
defendant’s conduct.148  Deliberation did not redress jurors’ use of the 
inappropriate evidence.149 In short, the only evidence that legally should have 
been integrated into the damage awarded was the damage sustained.  Once 
again, the research indicates otherwise. 
Evidence is not the only element considered when the jury begins 
deliberation.  After all of the evidence is presented, after every witness has 
testified, a juror hears one last thing before she leaves—the law.  When a judge 
instructs the jury about the law, courts presume that jurors understand and will 
 
 142. Kassin & Sukel, supra note 141, at 42. 
 143. Id. at 38. 
 144. Id. at 42. 
 145. Edith Greene, Michael Johns & Alison Smith, The Effects of Defendant Conduct on Jury 
Damage Awards, 86 J. APPLIED PSYCHOL. 228 (2001). 
 146. Id. at 228–37 (2001).  Through their research, Greene, Johns, and Smith predict the 
results of hindsight bias when a jury is deciding a verdict.  According to the hindsight principle, 
people cannot easily disregard information that they already have heard, nor can they easily 
reproduce the judgments they would have made without such information, although they believe 
that they can disregard this information.  Id. at 236.  Thus, the researchers hypothesize that jurors 
have difficulty ignoring evidence regarding the defendant’s behavior.  Id.  The researchers 
hypothesize that by using inappropriate evidence in rendering damages, jurors may return verdicts 
they intuitively perceive as more equitable.  Id.  They note that “[t]his reasoning reflects the just-
world belief that people who behave worse should be punished more severely.”  Id. at 237; see 
also Kamala London & Narina Nunez, The Effect of Jury Deliberations on Jurors’ Propensity to 
Disregard Inadmissible Evidence, 85 J. APPLIED PSYCHOL. 932, 932–39 (2000).  Psychologists 
Kamala London and Narina Nunez found that although inadmissible evidence significantly 
affected mock jurors’ verdicts, the mock jurors did not cite the inadmissible evidence as an 
important factor in their decisions.  Id. at 937.  This research suggests that jurors actually are not 
fully aware of the factors that influence their decision-making. 
 147. Greene, Johns & Smith, supra note 146, at 236. 
 148. Id. at 232–34. 
 149. Id. at 236. 
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follow these instructions.150  The Supreme Court has stated, “[W]e adhere to 
the crucial assumption underlying our constitutional system of trial by jury that 
jurors carefully follow instructions.”151 
Despite the Supreme Court’s encomium to the skill of juries, little 
evidence exists to support the assumption that jurors follow and understand 
instructions.152  For example, in one study, researchers determined that juror 
comprehension was less than 50%.153  In another related study, psychologist 
Reid Hastie and management scholars David A. Schkade and John W. Payne 
presented mock jurors with summaries of cases in which trial and appellate 
judges had previously decided that the defendant was not liable.154  After 
hearing instructions about liability, individual jurors found the defendant liable 
63% of the time.155  To explore the large disparity between the verdicts of the 
mock jurors and the judges, the researchers tested the mock jurors’ ability to 
recall/comprehend the instructions they were given about liability.  They found 
that the median mock juror was able to recall/comprehend only 5% of the 
instructions regarding liability.156  Skepticism regarding the Supreme Court’s 
assumption about juror perceptiveness in this realm seems justified. 
 
 150. Contra Anne Bowen Poulin, The Jury: The Criminal Justice System’s Different Voice, 
62 U. CIN. L. REV. 1377, 1383–84, 1392–97 (1994).  Poulin argues that juries ought to be allowed 
to decide a verdict based on factors other than the law.  “The jury offers relief from the 
unremitting rigor of the rule of law.”  Id. at 1383. 
 151. Francis v. Franklin, 471 U.S. 307, 324 n.9 (1985). 
 152. See Judith L. Ritter, Your Lips are Moving . . . but the Words Aren’t Clear: Dissecting 
the Presumption that Jurors Understand Instructions, 69 MO. L. REV. 163, 164 (2004).  Ritter 
examines five possible bases to support the presumption that jurors understand instructions: legal 
precedent, history, logic and rationality, empirical evidence, and policy.  Id. at 183–204.  She 
concludes that none of these bases support the presumption.  Id.; see Dann & Hans, supra note 
90, at 15–19; see also Patrick J. Kelley & Laurel A. Wendt, What Judges Tell Juries About 
Negligence: A Review of Pattern Jury Instructions, 77 CHI.-KENT. L. REV. 587, 616–23 (2002).  
Several solutions have been proposed to combat concerns regarding juror comprehension of legal 
instructions: (1) Giving preliminary instructions to the jury, (2) Giving final instructions prior to 
closing statements, and (3) Providing written copies of instructions to refer to during 
deliberations. 
 153. See Robert P. Charrow & Veda R. Charrow, Making Legal Language Understandable: A 
Psycholinguistic Study of Jury Instructions, 79 COLUM. L. REV. 1306, 1315–17 (1979). 
 154. Reid Hastie, David A. Schkade & John W. Payne, A Study of Juror and Jury Judgments 
in Civil Cases: Deciding Liability for Punitive Damages, 22 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 287, 287 
(1998). 
 155. Id. at 292–93. 
 156. Id. at 295; see also Lynne ForsterLee, Irwin A. Horowitz & Martin J. Bourgeois, Juror 
Competence in Civil Trials: Effects of Preinstruction and Evidence Technicality, 78 J. APPLIED 
PSYCHOL. 14, 19 (1993).  ForsterLee, Horowitz, and Bourgeois found that mock jurors were not 
able to distinguish among multiple plaintiffs in cases in which the evidence presented was highly 
technical.  Id.  In cases where the evidence was less technical, however, mock jurors’ had less 
difficulty distinguishing among multiple plaintiffs.  Id.  In addition, the researchers found that 
when jurors were presented with instructions concerning compensation awards after hearing the 
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A juror’s unwillingness or inability to follow the court’s instructions is 
evident in the social science research that indicates that jurors are not able to 
disregard legally inadmissible evidence, even when they are instructed by the 
judge to ignore that evidence.  Psychologists Kamala London and Narina 
Nunez found that mock jurors’ verdicts were biased by inadmissible evidence 
presented in a criminal sexual assault case.157  Research suggests that this 
tendency of jurors to be biased by legally inadmissible evidence is present in 
civil cases as well.  Specifically, jurors do not obey judges’ instructions to 
compartmentalize compensatory and punitive damages, according to 
behavioral scientists Michelle Chernikoff Anderson and Robert J. MacCoun.158  
In one experiment, they found that mock jurors who had no option to award 
punitive damages awarded compensatory damages that were on average 27% 
higher than mock jurors who had the option of awarding punitive damages.159  
This result suggests “either an inability of jurors to distinguish compensatory 
goals from punitive goals . . . or a conscious disregard for the law which calls 
for such compartmentalization.”160 
A second study by Anderson and MacCoun also documents the tendency 
in juries to either not understand the judges’ instructions or to deliberately 
ignore them.161  According to tort law, when the defendant has been found 
liable for negligence, jurors are to determine compensation based only on the 
extent of the plaintiff’s injuries.  The law implicitly precludes them from 
taking into account the reprehensibility of the defendant’s conduct.162  But in 
their second experiment, Anderson and MacCoun found that mock jurors who 
faced cases with plaintiffs exhibiting identical injuries awarded significantly 
higher compensatory damages when the defendant’s behavior was highly 
egregious than when the defendant’s behavior was less flagrant.163 
In criminal law, the egregious nature of the alleged crime also influences 
the outcome of the verdict despite any instructions on the law, according to a 
study preformed by scholars Harry Kalven, Jr. and Hans Zeisel.  They found 
that in 26 “simple rape cases”164 in which the judge convicted the defendant, 
 
case, they were significantly less likely to distinguish among multiple plaintiffs in their awards 
than when they were presented with instructions before hearing the case.  Id. 
 157. London & Nunez, supra note 146, at 934–35. 
 158. Michelle Chernikoff Anderson & Robert J. MacCoun, Goal Conflict in Juror 
Assessments of Compensatory and Punitive Damages, 23 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 313, 327–28 
(1999). 
 159. Id. at 321. 
 160. Id. 
 161. Id. at 322–25. 
 162. See id. at 314. 
 163. Anderson & MacCoun, supra note 158, at 325. 
 164. HARRY KALVEN, JR. & HANS ZEISEL, THE AMERICAN JURY 250–53 (1966).  The 
authors distinguish between aggravated rape and simple rape.  The former includes cases in which 
one or more of three elements are present: evidence of extrinsic violence, evidence of several 
SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW 
464 SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 50:425 
the jury, faced with the same evidence, acquitted the defendant in 60% of the 
cases.165  In sixty-four aggravated rape cases, however, in which the judge 
convicted the defendant, the jury agreed with the judge in more than 85% of 
the cases.166  The researchers conclude that rather than considering the legality 
of the verdict, “the jury chooses to redefine the crime of rape in terms of its 
notions of assumption of risk.”167  In other words, to a juror, not all rapes are 
equal.  Some victims are more responsible for their rape than others, despite 
the law’s opinion on the subject. 
Intentional or not, the juries’ disregard for both the law and judges’ 
instructions has caused some legal experts to argue against the assumption that 
the decision made by twelve individuals is more accurate and fair than the 
decision made by a judge.168  These experts believe that since juries are 
unfamiliar with the law and untrained in how to deliberate about a complex 
issue,169 they are more likely to err than a judge who, at minimum, understands 
the law and has had some formal training.  Others, however, resort to another 
tenuous assumption: jury deliberation alleviates these concerns. 
A few studies do support the assumption that jury deliberation 
compensates for juror irrationality and improves jurors’ reasoning skills.  For 
instance, psychologists Monica L. McCoy, Narina Nunez, and Matthew M. 
Dammeyer studied the effect of deliberation on jurors’ reasoning skills.  They 
found that mock jurors were more likely to reason at a higher level after 
 
assailants involved, or evidence that the victim and the defendant are complete strangers.  Id. at 
252.  Simple rape cases consist of cases in which none of the three elements are present.  Id.  The 
purpose of the distinction is to show that juries are significantly more likely to acquit a defendant 
accused of rape if there is evidence that the victim was engaged in questionable behavior—i.e., in 
situations of simple rape.  Id. 250–53; see Cass R. Sunstein, Probability Neglect: Emotion, Worst 
Cases, and Law, 112 YALE L.J. 61, 70 (2002).  Cass Sunstein identifies this behavior as 
“probability neglect”; this term refers to the human tendency to focus on adverse outcomes rather 
than the likelihood of these outcomes.  Id. at 70.  In terms of rape, if the victim is perceived to be 
somewhat responsible, then irrational fear is not induced in the jurors.  Aggravated rape, 
however, does induce intense fear–—because people believe it could happen to anyone—
therefore more irrational verdicts condemning defendants exist.  See id. at 68–70. 
 165. KALVEN & ZEISEL, supra note 164, at 253. 
 166. Id. 
 167. Id. at 254. 
 168. Contra Rachlinski, supra note 3, at 100. 
  Although it is possible that judges make better decisions than juries, there is little 
evidence to support this belief. . . . [J]udges encounter little or no feedback on the quality 
of their decisions, making it difficult for them to learn decision making on the job.  
Furthermore, research indicates that judges, like everyone else, are susceptible to illusions 
of judgment. 
Id. 
 169. But see Edward V. Di Lello, Fighting Fire with Firefighters: A Proposal for Expert 
Judges at the Trial Level, 93 COLUM. L. REV. 473, 473–74 (1993), for an argument that even 
judges are not qualified to arbitrate highly technical trials. 
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deliberation in twelve-person juries than mock jurors who did not deliberate.170  
In addition to enhancing jurors’ reasoning skills, deliberation attenuates 
extralegal biases, according to other research.  A study done by Kaplan and 
Miller found that although mock jurors were significantly affected by 
extralegal factors in rendering verdicts, the effect of these factors on jurors’ 
verdicts disappeared after deliberating in twelve member juries.171  Similarly, 
scholars Jeffrey Kerwin and David R. Shaffer found that although 
predeliberation mock jury members were often biased by inadmissible 
evidence in rendering their verdicts, after deliberation they changed their 
verdicts and disregarded the inadmissible evidence.172 
From the previous studies, it appears that deliberation attenuates extralegal 
biases.  However, other researchers have found that the effect of deliberation 
on jurors’ memories is minimal at best.  Their research contests the legitimacy 
of the assumption that deliberation improves the rationality of jurors.  
Psychologists Mary E. Pritchard and Janice M. Keenan found that although 
deliberation did not significantly distort the facts in mock jurors’ memories, 
deliberation improved mock jurors’ memory accuracy only slightly.173  
Additionally, this small memory improvement effect held only for peripheral 
trial information, and not for the central facts of the case.174  In a study using 
 
 170. Monica L. McCoy, Narina Nunez & Matthew M. Dammeyer, The Effect of Jury 
Deliberations on Jurors’ Reasoning Skills, 23 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 557, 570–71 (1999).  
McCoy et al. assessed jurors’ reasoning competence as defined by Kuhn, Weinstock, and Flaton. 
Id. at 558.  Kuhn, Weinstock, and Flaton have developed a reasoning continuum for juror 
competence.  See Deanna Kuhn, Michael Weinstock & Robin Flaton, How Well Do Jurors 
Reason? Competence Dimensions of Individual Variation in a Juror Reasoning Task, 5 PSYCHOL. 
SCI. 289, 289 (1994).  At the low-competence end of the continuum, jurors construct a single 
narrative based on the evidence presented and discount any evidence that does not mesh with this 
narrative.  Id.  At the optimal-performance end of the continuum, jurors use conflicting evidence 
to construct multiple narratives.  Id.  They then evaluate the extent to which the extant evidence is 
consistent with each narrative and evaluate each narrative–evidence combination against the 
alternative combinations.  Id. 
 171. Martin F. Kaplan & Lynn E. Miller, Reducing the Effects of Juror Bias, 36 J. 
PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 1443, 1453–55 (1978). 
 172. Jeffrey Kerwin & David R. Shaffer, Mock Jurors Versus Mock Juries: The Role of 
Deliberations in Reaction to Inadmissible Testimony, 20 PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. BULL. 
153, 159–61 (1994); see also London & Nunez, supra note 146, at 937 (corroborating Kerwin 
and Shaffer’s findings). 
 173. Mary E. Pritchard & Janice M. Keenan, Does Jury Deliberation Really Improve Jurors’ 
Memories?, 16 APPLIED COGNITIVE PSYCHOL. 589, 599–600 (2002). 
 174. Id. at 595.  The researchers also found that the correlation between mock jurors’ memory 
accuracy and their confidence in their memory accuracy was almost nonexistent.  Id. at 597.  
Based on this finding, they hypothesize that deliberation has such a small effect on jurors’ 
memories because those jurors who control deliberation do not always have the most accurate 
memories.  Id. at 598.  In addition, the researchers argue that the unexpectedly small deliberation 
effect on jurors’ memories is a result of the jurors’ general overconfidence in their memory 
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actual cases, Hastie, Schkade, and Payne found that deliberation actually 
slightly worsened juror decision-making.175  They found that after deliberation, 
mock jurors were 2% more likely to find the defendant liable when a judge had 
previously found that the defendant was not liable.176  The overall rate of post-
deliberation verdicts of liability was 58%.177 
Additionally, group pressures or personal agendas could negatively affect 
jury deliberations.178  In 1996 when the Tyco Toy Company introduced the 
Tickle Me Elmo doll, parents tackled each other in the middle of department 
stores, argued in public, and waited for hours to purchase the $35.00 toy.179  As 
publicity surrounding the toy increased, the demand for the product 
skyrocketed.180  Social pressure to provide one’s child with the most popular 
and “coolest” Christmas gift had driven otherwise reasonable adults into a 
frenzy.  Similarly, an assertive and persuasive group of several jurors eager to 
return to work, the golf course, or a family function could pressure otherwise 
reasonable but more passive jurors into voting for a specific verdict in order to 
expedite deliberations.181  For example, in 2002, after four days of deliberation 
in a perjury trial, a holdout juror sobbed and pleaded with the judge to release 
him from jury service because his fellow jurors were pressuring him to change 
his vote.182  A day after the juror was released and the alternate juror was in 
place, the jury returned a guilty verdict.183  
IV.  CONCLUSION 
Respect for the jury system and the market as an allocative and 
distributional device derives from shared dependence on certain foundational 
assumptions.  The utility and moral legitimacy associated with these two core 
 
accuracy; their inability to realize that they do not remember all precludes their asking for 
clarification during deliberation.  Id. at 597–600. 
 175. Hastie, Schkade & Payne, supra note 154, at 287, 304. 
 176. Id. at 293. 
 177. Id.  When hung juries were excluded, the rate of liable verdicts rose to 67%.  Id. 
 178. See Ballew v. Georgia, 435 U.S. 223, 232–33 (1978); Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 
145, 157 (1968). 
 179. Joe Sharkey, JERSEY; Elmo, the Spirit of Christmas, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 22, 1996, at 1. 
 180. See id. 
 181. See Alvin Zander, The Psychology of Group Processes, 30 ANNUAL REV. PSYCHOL. 
417, 428–32 (1979). 
 182. See Mike McKee, Real Jurors Don’t Cry, THE RECORDER, Aug. 18, 2004, 
http://www.law.com/jsp/article.jsp?id=109018035488.  The judge determined that the man was 
suffering from “‘real personal stress’ because of his fellow jurors’ pressure to make him change 
his vote.”  Id.  However, on appeal, the appellate court stated that “[t]he fact that Juror 2 reached 
a conclusion different from that of the other jurors did not render him unable to deliberate . . . . 
Rather than being faced with a juror unable or unwilling to perform his duties, the court was 
faced with a jury that was deadlocked after lengthy deliberations.”  Id. 
 183. Id. 
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institutions resides in the validity of these assumptions.  Primary among them 
are faith in the degree of cognitive acuity that it is fair to presume in typical 
aggregations of jurors and consumers.  If jurors and consumers are curious, 
circumspect, overwhelmingly attentive to relevant evidentiary factors, and 
possessed of judgmental standards that we would ordinarily associate with 
good reasoning, then markets and juries promise to fulfill the aspirations of 
those who tout them. 
But social science data does not support these assumptions.  They give us a 
portrayal of human decision-makers who are, as Nietzsche famously said, 
“human, all too human.”184  Sometimes they are attentive to rational criteria; 
sometimes they are not.  Wishing that humans were more proficient decision-
makers does not make them so.  When we see jurors and consumers as capable 
of rationality under the guidance of rules and procedures that take humans as 
they are and not as they might be, we are on the road to more effective use of 
juries and markets.  If the social science portrayal of jurors is accurate, 
continued respect for the role of the jury in the adversary system of justice 
demands a search for just such rules and procedures. 
 
 184. FRIEDRICH NIETZSCHE, HUMAN, ALL TOO HUMAN: A BOOK FOR FREE SPIRITS (1879). 
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